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Toward a Multiple Party Representation Model: 
Moderating Power Disparity 
HENRY ORDOWER* 
This Article argues that the zealous representation model of contemporary legal 
practice, with its emphasis only on the client, often results in lawyers assisting 
and motivating their clients to exploit the clients power advantages in non-
litigation contexts. The Article recommends that ethical rules shift to a multiple 
client representation model, based upon the Brandeisian lawyer for the 
situation. The model would empower attorneys in non-litigation settings to 
encourage their clients to consider and evaluate the impact on other 
constituencies that the representation may affect. Attorneys would become better 
able to encourage their clients to seek distributional fairness and balance in their 
business and personal legal activities to the possible long-term advantage of 
both client and lawyer. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans probably would agree that the rule of law is critical to a peaceful 
society. Reliance on and belief in disinterested judges, administrative specialists 
and arbitrators to resolve disputes fairly and peacefully are fundamental to the 
modern American system. Government agencies are available to enforce 
judgments and awards. Complex pleading rules that America inherited from 
England have disappeared; transparent and easily mastered pleading rules have 
replaced them. Yet, legal process is not free from complexity or opportunity to 
delay and sometimes prevent the rendition of court judgments by use of motions 
and discovery.1
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. J.D., M.A., The University of 
Chicago, A.B., Washington University. The author thanks his student research assistant, 
Rebecca Shiflet, and Margaret McDermott, a law librarian, for assistance with research; his 
faculty colleagues who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this Article at a faculty 
workshop in February 2002; and his spouse, Ilene Ordower, who proofread several drafts of 
this Article. 
1 See generally Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil 
Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561 (1996); Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: 
From Studies of Cost and Delay to the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 597 (1998); Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: 
Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709 (1998). 
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Deeply embedded in American legal practice, zealous advocacy defines the 
legal culture,2 and remains vital to lawyers understanding of their professional 
role.3 Zealous advocacy can take precedence over ones own moral views as law 
students learn not to decline to represent individuals with whom the students 
disagree or who advance unpopular causes (whether or not the students agree 
with the cause).4 Law schools traditionally rely on casebooks for instructional 
material, emphasizing litigation and litigation outcomes as a primary method for 
learning the rules of law. Winning the case is of paramount importance. In the 
first year of law school, when students generally take a legal writing course, they 
observe that skill in persuasion and advocacy defines the quality of the lawyer. 
Students learn to argue their clients interests whether the students believe their 
client to be right or wrong. The Model Rules sanction such an approach to the 
clients interests.5 Even negotiation as a topic of law school curricula emphasizes 
advocacy. Negotiation targets securing the most beneficial outcome for ones 
client rather than seeking a balanced reconciliation of competing interests. The 
assumption is that the counter-party to the negotiation also seeks the most 
beneficial outcome for the counter-partys client as well and will competently 
advocate for that client. With zealous advocates on both sides of the negotiation, 
the outcome should achieve a reasonable balance; if not, one of the advocates 
failed to represent her client adequately.6
Lawyers and law students most often learn contract-drafting skills outside the 
law school setting,7 through summer or part-time employment with a law firm. 
As law students begin to prepare contracts, they rely heavily on existing forms 
that lawyers in the firm may have developed over lengthy periods and numerous 
transactions. The forms tend to depart from non-performance and remedies rather 
2 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, also referred to as the Model Code in 
the following, imposes the duty of zealous advocacy upon lawyers. Ethical Consideration 7-1 
reads: [t]he duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client 
zealously within the bounds of the law. MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 
(1986). 
3 While the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, also referred to as the Model Rules in 
the following, soften the emphasis on zeal as the cultural norm of law practice, the Model Rules 
nevertheless begin with zealous advocacy and moderate zeal as necessary to respond to non-
adversarial contexts. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 8 (2002). The primary sets of 
ethical rules this Article examines are those the American Bar Association issued.  
4 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2002). 
5 Id. 
6 Power negotiating is the ability to change the attitude or behavior of anotherto get 
your way when dealing with others. DAVID V. LEWIS, POWER NEGOTIATING TACTICS AND 
TECHNIQUES 9 (1981). 
7 Law schools frequently do integrate some drafting exercises into a variety of courses and 
through their legal research and writing programs, but contract drafting rarely consumes as 
much of the students time as brief writing or expository writing (law review notes). 
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than assumed performance and satisfactory economic accommodation. Thus, new 
lawyers learn that their primary objective is to protect their client from all possible 
eventualities when the other party to the contract fails to perform. Professor Karl 
Llewellyn observed, [b]usiness lawyers tend to draft to the edge of the 
possible.8 The orientation toward one-sided, all-eventualities drafting becomes 
the office practice complement to Rambo depositions and similar discovery 
practices in litigation.9 And new lawyers learn from other lawyers to provide the 
same zealous representation.  
The growth of the law and economics movement has fortified the culture of 
zeal by making the comparison of economic costs and benefits the essence of 
legal analysis. The Coase Theorem stimulated the law and economics 
movement,10 a now dominant feature of modern American legal analysis and 
planning.11 Consistent with economic analysis,12 American lawyers strive to 
attain maximal benefit for their clients within the bounds of the law. So long as 
the client does not violate the law, harm to others from maximizing the clients 
8 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMN, 1 HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
177 (1954). The then proposed unconscionability provision of the Uniform Commercial 
Code would have protected consumers from unreasonable and unnecessary contractual 
provisions.
9 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
10 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), has been read in a 
number of differing manners. One formulation of the Coase Theorem might be that identifiable 
and stable property rightswithout regard to moral considerationsare critical to a rational 
legal and economic system because stable rights facilitate economically efficient bargaining 
with respect to the rights. Moral considerations might help parties to predict legal outcomes 
where the legal rights are uncertain, but they do not contribute to efficient resource allocations. 
Changes in legally protected rights generate displacements. With any change in rights, there 
may be both positive and negative impacts. Thus, in formulating or changing legal rules, courts 
or legislatures ought to regard total effect, rather than some narrower transactional effect. 
Coase, however, does not limit total effect to economic factors alone. See discussion infra Part 
VI. 
11 Economic analysis is less significant to litigation than it is to transactional planning 
because litigation outcomes depend upon the analytical methods that third party arbiters 
employ. Even sound economic analysis, as opposed to other non-economic factors, may not 
persuade the fact finder or judge. Certain judges do have the reputation for applying economic 
analysis in their decision making. Most recognizable among judges who consistently employ 
law and economics analysis to their decisions are Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook of the 
Seventh Circuit. See Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing 
the Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141 (2002), 
for empirical research and analysis of the frequency with which casebooks cite opinions that 
economics-oriented judges write. 
12 The Coase Theorem assumes equal bargaining power and a well-defined property rule 
in order to generate an economically efficient outcome. Power disparity may distort the 
efficiency of the result. Moreover, Coase does not limit analysis to readily quantifiable 
economic factors. Coase, supra note 10, at 4244; see also discussion infra Part VI. 
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benefit may become a matter of cost-benefit comparison.13 So if the costs of the 
clients actions, including compensation for damage that the client may have to 
pay for harm caused, are less than the benefit the client derives, the lawyer will 
recommend the course of action accordingly.14 Decision making becomes a 
function of cost-benefit analysis as lawyers encourage their clients to disregard 
non-economic factors. 
Some recent legal scholarship suggests that the legal profession attracts 
adversarial personalities to its ranks. Susan Daicoff identifies eight characteristics 
of those drawn to law that confirm the adversarial personality of lawyers:  
materialism, need for achievement, preference for dominance, competitiveness, 
tendency to respond to stress by becoming more aggressive and ambitious, 
insensitivity to interpersonal, emotional, humanistic concerns, the Myers-Briggs 
dimension of Thinking as an approach to decision making, and a rights 
orientation to moral decision making (as opposed to an ethic of care).15
Accordingly, lawyers embedded personality traits perpetuate zeal as fundamental 
to the lawyering culture. Other studies, like the interviews that Lawrence Joseph 
conducted, confirm the existence of a personality range among those that the legal 
profession draws.16 Similarly, clients have come to expect zeal from their 
lawyers. The popular media, both print and television, generally depict attorneys 
in their litigating postures as ardent advocates of their clients causes. This image 
of the lawyer regularly enjoys a positive spin as attorneys determinedly pursue 
unpopular but just causes and help to free clients who are wrongly accused of 
crimes, even when the representation is not remunerative. Newsworthy lawyers 
often are those who sit beside their clients at Congressional hearings and protect 
13 Lawyers often consider the costs and benefits of violating the law as they evaluate the 
risk of possible criminal sanctions to the client in adopting certain courses of action. Participants 
in both the tobacco and the automobile manufacturing industries have pursued courses of 
conduct that have harmed others, possibly criminally, following careful legal analyses of the 
risks. See discussion of the Pinto analysis in George Priest, Economic of Civil Justice Reform 
Proposals, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 401, 40203 (2000). 
14 Economic factors are not necessarily predictable or simple to quantify despite 
widespread use of this type of economic analysis. 
15 Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers 
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to 
Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 594 
(1998).
16 LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND (1993) (presenting a study of the lawyers 
personality reflected through a series of partially fictionalized interviews that offers a bleak 
picture of the lawyers character); see also Pierre Schlag, The Lawyerland Essays, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1730, 173096 (2001) (offering commentaries by Schlag, David A. Skeel, Jr., Robin 
West, Sarah Krakoff, David Luban, Robert Weisberg, and Lawrence Joseph). 
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their clients by advising them not to answer questions. The public face of the legal 
profession emerges from and reinforces the culture of zeal.  
But this public view of lawyering takes shape primarily in litigation settings 
where zealous advocacy may be both desirable and essential. The lawyers 
personality traits may be psychologically necessary to allow lawyers to represent 
unpopular clients or causes and facilitate equal access to justice.17 In an 
adversarial posture in which each adversary has the luxury of competent 
representation and adequate resources to pursue litigation, few would doubt that 
the lawyer ought to represent the client zealously and seek to assist the client to 
accomplish the clients lawful objectives.18 Much lawyering, however, either is 
not inherently adversarial,19 or involves circumstances of power disparity that 
preclude one of the adversaries from advancing his interests effectively.20
This Article inquires whether the culture of zeal with its accompanying single 
client representation model confines lawyering inappropriately and unnecessarily 
by prohibiting or restricting lawyers from representing multiple clients, as they 
should, in many non-litigation contexts. The Article observes that single client 
representation as a generally ideal lawyering model,21 is a myth when applied to 
the lawyers role in modern civil, office practice.22 The single client model often 
propels the lawyer to encourage her client to exploit a power advantage in ways 
that might not occur to the client, that the client would eschew absent the lawyers 
encouragement and that even might not be in the clients best interests in the long 
term.  
The Article argues that despite real and potential conflicts of interest, a 
multiple client representation model better suits much non-litigation practice than 
17 Daicoff, supra note15, at 594. 
18 See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 8 (2002); see also supra note 3. 
19 Attorneys help solve an array of problems that do not place parties at odds to one 
another. In fact, lawyers even seek to solve problems that clients and prospective clients do not 
know they have. See discussion of the lawyer as entrepreneur infra Part VII.C. 
20 See discussion of power disparity infra Part VI. 
21 For example, Debra Lyn Bassett, Threes a Crowd: A Proposal to Abolish Joint 
Representation, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 387, 388 (2001), forcefully argues that existing conflicts of 
interest rules are too lax, as they are aimed at facilitating the business of law rather than the 
professionalism of lawyers.  
22 The American Bar Associations recent revisions to the Model Rules would seem 
to acknowledge how common multiple client representation is in contemporary American 
law practice. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002) governing conflicts of 
interest focuses upon the issue of concurrent conflicts of interest far more than its 
predecessor, MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001), did. The newer rule 
permits the lawyer to represent multiple clients with concurrent conflicts so long as each 
client gives informed consent to the common representation. Commentary to the newer 
rule elaborates extensively on the common representation model of practice but does 
not encourage adopting the model as this Article does. 
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the traditional single client model.23 A multiple client representation model would 
permit and, in some instances, require the lawyer to evaluate the impact of her 
advice to the client on other constituencies that the prospective conduct affects. 
Lawyers would accommodate legal advice to the needs and interests of those 
other constituencies.24 The underlying premise of the multiple client model is that 
clients, free from contrary influences, including legal advice grounded in 
economic analysis and evaluation of legal exposure, generally prefer not to 
exploit power in ways that are harmful to others. Clients are willing to forego 
some immediate economic advantage in favor of harmony and conflict avoidance 
that might serve them better in the future.25 Recent behavioral studies using 
economic game playing confirm that fair dealing and sharing take precedence 
over profit maximization.26 Moreover, economic game theory suggests that 
cooperative sharing frequently enhances profitability for all parties.27
Part II of this Article will provide some background concerning how current 
ethical rules encourage zealous advocacy in a single client representation model. 
Part III explores traditional multiple party representation as a model for non-
litigation lawyering. Part IV looks at other constituencies that attorneys 
representation of clients affects and builds upon the multiple client representation 
model to propose a standard for consideration of those constituencies. Part V 
briefly reviews current discourse in legal ethics as it addresses separate codes for 
specialty areas and the development of the ethics of care. Part VI addresses power 
disparities and their exploitation. Part VII introduces concepts of the lawyers 
varying interventional roles. Part VIII presents examples of interventional 
functions and interests of other constituencies. Part IX concludes that current 
ethical rules limit lawyers responsibility to indirect clients and recommends 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See infra Parts VI, VIII. 
25 Cf. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ch. 10 (1994) (proposing a moral discourse with the client as part of the 
lawyers counseling). The authors express the view that the client will adopt a conciliatory 
course of action if the lawyer gently offers an analysis based upon fairness. Id. In the authors 
example the client wishes to oppose a zoning variance for a home for men but the lawyer 
persuades the client to evaluate the operation of the home and its impact on the neighborhood, 
thereby leading the client to conclude that the impact on the neighborhood will not be as 
unfavorable as the client initially anticipated. Id. at 11619. The context of the example is 
litigation-like, with the lawyer acting with respect to specific instructions and seeking to 
persuade the client to abandon his chosen course of action. Id.; cf. infra Parts VII.A, VIII.C 
(discussing the scrivener lawyer). 
26 See generally Bruce Bower, A Fair Share of the Pie: People Everywhere Put a Social 
Spin on Economic Exchanges, 161 SCI. NEWS 104 (2002) (comparing studies of economic 
exchanges within various cultures). See further discussion infra Part VI. 
27 See generally JOHN F. NASH, JR., ESSAYS ON GAME THEORY (1996); MARTIN J. 
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS (1990). 
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broader indirect client obligations based upon a multiple party representational 
model as part of the norm for legal ethics. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CULTURE OF ZEAL, THE MODEL CODE AND THE 
MODEL RULES
Level playing fields enable disinterested arbiters, judges and arbitrators to 
make informed and fair decisions. Whenever one party has greater resources than 
the other, this paradigm shifts. Differentials in resources may provide tactical 
advantages. No longer does the disinterested arbiter necessarily gain access to all 
information that might be pertinent to a fair decision. One party may use its 
greater resources to limit access to important information,28 overwhelm the 
arbiter with information favorable to that party or simply delay the rendition of an 
unfavorable decision in order to arbitrage the difference between pre-judgment 
interest and investment return.29 Conscientious arbiters, undoubtedly, free 
themselves from the influences of resource disparity and reach a fair result in any 
event. And thoughtful, creative advocates may enable the resource-disadvantaged 
party to overcome the limitations on resources through persuasive advocacy. 
Nevertheless, power disparity remains troubling because it increases the risk that 
the legal system will generate an unjust result as the zealous advocate for the 
resource-advantaged party exploits her clients superior resources to her clients 
advantage. Furthermore, non-litigation-based interaction with the legal system 
lacks the intermediation of a disinterested arbiter to aid in leveling the playing 
field. Unfortunately, standard ethical rules governing law practice do not change 
with the power paradigm or the non-litigation context.30
Criticism that the Model Code suited only litigation practice and not the 
transactional practice of law in part led the American Bar Association to develop 
the Model Rules.31 While the Model Rules may address some ethical issues that 
the transactional lawyer faces better than the Model Code did, both the Model 
Rules and the Model Code fortify the adversarial, single client advocacy model. 
Single client models are simple and easy to police. Divided loyalties and 
28 Resisting discovery, for example. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, 
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 509, 511 (1994). 
29 Id. at 536. 
30 The Model Rules assume that personal conscience and the approbation of professional 
peers guide the lawyers behavior with respect to matters that neither law nor the Model Rules 
govern. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 7 (2002). And the negative inference of 
Model Rules preamble eight suggests that zealous representation may be inappropriate when 
the opponent is not well represented. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 8.  
31 For a brief description of the history of the professional responsibility rules, see Steven 
C. Krane, Ethics 2000: What Might Have Been, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 323 (1999). 
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balancing of interests, the touchstones of multiple client representation, are not 
accommodating to bright line rules for codes of professional conduct.32 Yet 
multiple client representation is characteristic of much of civil, non-litigation 
representation.33
Until the most recent revision of the Model Rules,34 neither the Model Code 
nor the Model Rules provided practical guidelines for ethical conduct in the realm 
of traditional multiple party representation.35 Neither departs from the adversarial, 
single client advocacy model to address constituencies other than readily 
identifiable clients.36 Both sets of rules emphasize the primacy of the client in the 
lawyer-client relationship. Both tend to trivialize the impact that representation 
may have on third parties and do not compel the lawyer to consider broader 
ethical questions of other parties in the course of client representation. The Model 
Code focuses on the identifiable client, as it requires the lawyer to represent the 
client zealously within the bounds of the law.37 Under the Model Code, the 
advocate has no duty to adversaries or other third parties other than the duty to 
avoid needless injury to others38 and the more general obligation to the courts that 
requires lawyers to disclose adverse authority.39
32 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9 (2002). 
33 See discussion infra Part IV. 
34 See supra note 22 (discussing recent changes to Model Rule 1.7).
35 Until the most recent revision of the Model Rules that withdrew MODEL RULES OF 
PROFL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2001), the Model Rules sought to address some non-
representational roles that lawyers assume with that rule. Model Rule 2.2 permitted the 
lawyer to serve as an intermediary but required withdrawal when the going got rough. For an 
extensive discussion of the concept of intermediation under the withdrawn Model Rule 2.2, see 
John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in the 
Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741 (1992). The Model Rules now view 
intermediation primarily as a non-representational role that the Model Rules no longer 
expressly regulate. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 3 (2002).
36 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶¶ 19 (2002) address broader roles for 
the lawyer but do not transform many of those roles into rules of conduct. MODEL RULES 
OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002), a conflict of interests regulation, acknowledges the 
prevalence of multiple party representation and both facilitates and discourages such 
representation. But see Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 76567 (observing that Model Rule 2.2 
as in effect, before withdrawal, was applicable and permitted a broad variety of multiple client 
representation).  
37 MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1986); MODEL CODE OF PROFL 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1986). 
38 Model Code EC 7-10 offers that zealous advocacy does not preclude treating others 
with consideration in order to avoid inflicting needless harm. Implicit is the assumption that 
the lawyer will inflict harm on others when necessary to zealous client representation. MODEL 
CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1986). 
39 MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1) (1986). 
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In fact, an obligation not to lie is absent from the Model Code and the Model 
Rules.40 The Model Code controls misrepresentation to opponents through 
conflict rules that prohibit communication to a represented party41 and prohibit 
advising a party whose interests may be adverse to those of ones client.42 The 
Model Rules go somewhat further and prohibit the making of a false statement 
of material fact or law to a third person and the failure to disclose material facts 
if necessary to prevent the lawyer from assisting a criminal or fraudulent act.43
Not only did the American Bar Association fail to compel lawyers to be 
truthful but also missed its opportunity to limit attorneys assistance to clients 
who overreach less powerful contracting parties by including unenforceable and 
unconscionable provisions in contracts. The ABA failed to intervene at contract 
drafting level as it rejected a proposed rule that would have prohibited attorneys 
from including illegal provisions in contracts.44
40 Discussion drafts of the Model Rules, if adopted, would have required significantly 
more truthfulness in negotiation than the rule the ABA adopted. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL 
CONDUCT R. 44.3 (Discussion Draft 1980). See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The 
Lawyers Obligation to be Trustworthy when Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 181 (1981) (examining whether lawyers should have an obligation to be truthful and 
concludes that each practice level (lawyering subculture) has its own conventions and that 
general rules on truthfulness other than fraud proscription are impractical); Gary Tobias 
Lowenthal, The Bars Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 411 (1988) (contending that lawyers always should be truthful and the ABA missed its 
opportunity to require truthfulness). 
41 MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1986). 
42 MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(2) (1986). 
43 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002). The affirmative disclosure 
obligation with regard to material facts is prospective only so that the lawyer will not further a 
criminal or fraudulent act. Completed client acts require no disclosure. Model Rule 1.6 
governing confidential communications precludes disclosure of most prospective matters if 
disclosure would violate a clients confidence. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 
(2002). Recently, however, the Internal Revenue Service has argued successfully that the 
tax practitioner-client privilege under I.R.C. 7525 (2003) does not protect the generalized 
advice that an tax practitioner (or attorney) provides in creating a tax shelter product for a 
promoter even if the practitioner has contact with the promoters clients. See United 
States v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 337 F.3d 802, 813 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying investors 
right to intervene to prevent enforcement of a summons for customer lists).  
44 The ABA rejected the draft of Model Rule 4.3 that would have included that 
prohibition. The proposed rule read: [a] lawyer shall not conclude an agreement, or assist a 
client in concluding an agreement, that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is illegal, 
contains legally prohibited terms, would work a fraud, or would be held to be unconscionable 
as a matter of law. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.3 (Discussion Draft 1980). For 
thoughtful analysis and criticism of that rejected provision, see William T. Vukowich, Lawyers 
and The Standard Form Contract System: A Model Rule That Should Have Been, 6 GEO. J. 
LEG. ETHICS 799, 833 (1993).  
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At the same time, confidentiality rules expressly disfavor multiple party 
representation that would serve as a model for the balancing of varying 
interests.45 Multiple party representation creates an unavoidable conflict because 
effective representation of one party may require the attorney to use and reveal 
confidential information received from another represented party. While all 
parties may consent to the multiple representation and concomitant disclosures in 
support of the representation, the Model Rules make the representation awkward. 
Consent to disclosure before the necessary degree of disclosure becomes known 
renders it difficult to ascertain whether the attorney will be able to comply with 
the requirement that the representation not be materially limited by the lawyers 
responsibilities to another client.46
Further, neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code offers strong protection 
to the public from lawyers misconduct. Neither provides remedies to clients, 
much less non-clients, whom the lawyers conduct affects.47 If the relevant state 
bar has adopted either the Code or the Rules, violations of specific ethical rules 
may result in the bar or the states high court taking disciplinary action against the 
lawyer. Historically, no private right of action inured to the parties the lawyers 
misconduct affected under the Code or the Rules.48
In fact, compliance with the Code or the Rules as the relevant jurisdiction 
adopts them may shield the attorney who follows the rules from liability for 
misconduct.49 Professional malpractice arises when the professional fails to meet 
Courts occasionally have been better than the legal professions self-regulatory 
associations in limiting the exploitation of power advantages as they refuse to enforce 
particularly distasteful contractual rights. See, e.g., Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co. of Iowa, 855 
F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1988) (concerning a lender not telling borrower that she could have 
repaid the same loan with lower monthly payments in one-half the time deprived her of fair 
notice and amounted to unfair surprise); Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 37980, 38384 
(Alaska 1986) (holding it was unconscionable for real estate agent to purchase 73 year-old 
womans property on 30-year term with payments that did not even cover the accruing interest; 
court reformed contract to reflect reasonable payments); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 
N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (finding purchase price of $1235 for freezer unit worth 
approximately $300 unconscionable and reduced by court). 
45 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). 
46 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002). 
47 The Model Rules mention disciplinary proceedings, but look to substantive law for 
other regulation of lawyers behavior. The Model Rules do not offer a private right of action.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT scope ¶¶ 1415 (2002). 
48 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6.31 (5th ed. 2000); 
see Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting reference to the 
ethical rules during trial as not relevant to the legal standard of care); see also Note, The 
Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice: Erasing a Double Standard, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1102, 110506 (1996). 
49 Cf. Lowenthal, supra note 40, at 44547. 
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industry standards in the practice of a profession.50 The Code and the Rules 
provide a valuable definition of industry standards with respect to general, 
operational matters, as opposed to level of skill and competence, in representation 
of clients.51 So compliance with the Code or Rules means that the attorney has 
met certain industry standards while failure to comply is not prima facie evidence 
of malpractice (although failure to comply may be evidentiary of malpractice).52
III. MODELING MULTIPLE PARTY REPRESENTATION53
Despite ethics rules that disfavor multiple party representation,54 such 
representation remains common and generally successful.55 With the possible 
exception of divorce,56 multiple party representation is successful in the sense that 
few complaints to state bar associations57 and few legal malpractice claims arise 
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 299A (1965) for an explanation of 
professional negligence. 
51 Id. 
52 See, e.g., Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719, 721 (Ga. 
1995) (holding that professional ethical standards are evidence of the common law duty of 
care); see also Note, supra note 48, at 1108. 
53 Compare the discussion of Justice Louis D. Brandeiss concept of the lawyer for the 
situation in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 63437 
(3d ed. 1999) or the more extensive discussion in Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 74857. 
Brandeis concept embraced a far greater interventional model than simply drafting documents 
for a deal. His lawyering for the situation included a considerable mediation or arbitration 
function.  
54 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
55 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 78384 (rejecting firmly the Brandeisian notion of 
representing the situation rather than the parties, so that intermediation is multiple client 
representation and not situational representation). 
56 Id. at 759. While divorce is regularly a matter of mutual assent, animosities are difficult 
to overcome and emotions may run high rendering it extremely difficult for a single lawyer to 
intermediate between the divorcing parties. 
57 For example, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission 
assembled some statistics for 2000 that disclose that 21% of complaints filed with the Hearing 
Boar involve conflicts of interest. ILL. ATTORNEY AND DISCIPLINARY COMMN, ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION chart 8 (2000),
available at http://www.iardc.org/main_annreport.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003). More than 
half of those filings involved concurrent conflicts in violation of Model Rule 1.7 but the 
statistics do not show how many of those complaints were non-consensual concurrent 
representation. Id. One-third of the concurrent conflict cases resulted in disciplinary action. Id.
at chart 15. Moreover, a far smaller percentage of docketed charges (probably under 5%) 
involved violation of Rule 1.7. Id. at chart 2. Similarly, John E. Howe, Report of the Office of 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel, 56 J. MO. B. 277, 28081 (2000), shows 4 cases of transactional 
conflicts in Missouri of 925 complaints filed. 
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from a lawyer representing multiple parties in business transactions or general 
representation involving multiple family members.58 Multiple party 
representation generally compels the lawyer to balance competing interests of the 
clients the representation concerns. Limited anecdotal evidence suggests that 
lawyers whose practices regularly place them in multiple party representational 
settings develop a facility for balancing interests and making clients comfortable 
with the lawyers role.59
While the task of balancing multiple, sometimes disparate interests seems 
daunting, many practitioners do just that with considerable success. Mindful of 
the barriers that the ethical rules present to such representation, many of those 
practitioners would deny that they represent multiple clients in a single transaction 
or context where disharmonies among the clients are present. Candor with respect 
to multiple party representation threatened and certainly delayed the Senate 
Confirmation of Justice Brandeis appointment to the United States Supreme 
Court.60 Yet, multiple client representation is common61 and provides a useful 
model for protecting the interests of other constituencies that the representation 
affects. 
The paradigm for multiple client representation involves several parties 
acting together who agree to engage the lawyer to prepare documentation for a 
business venture in which they all will participate. The parties negotiate the 
economic, managerial and control terms of their deal and the lawyer will describe 
the deals structure and the parties interests in the venture in appropriate 
58 The American Bar Association has collected limited amounts of statistical information 
in ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS PROFL LIAB., LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN THE 
1990S (1996) and ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS PROFL LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 19961999 (2001) [hereinafter ABA PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS 19961999]. Table 5 to the 19961999 study discloses that only 5% of claims involve 
a conflict of interest. Id. at 12. In commenting on the increase in conflicts of interest claims 
from the 1990s study, the 19961999 study observes: [t]hese claims are brought upon by the 
volatile nature of the business community with executives and key employee [sic] moving from 
company to company and their lawyers also changing firms at a greater rate than ever before. 
Id. Thus, the committee does not see multiple party representation as the source of conflicts 
claims. While some nearly 9% of malpractice claims involve estates, trusts and probate, many 
of those involve complaints that the attorney had inadequate knowledge of the law or that the 
attorney did not consider or represent interests of non-client family members. Id. at 5; see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Privity Requirement Reconsidered, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 967, 981
83 (1996). 
59 The anecdotal evidence stems from discussions with sole and small firm practitioners 
and personal observation in practice settings. 
60 John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 69799 
(1965). Being Jewish, however, may have been a more significant factor causing the Senate to 
scrutinize Brandeis record with greater care than it might have had he not been a Jew.  
61 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 761. 
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documents.62 The lawyer is to be a scrivener,63 preparing the document according 
to instructions, making it legally understandable and enforceable by all. To the 
extent the lawyer has any advisory role, it is to identify structural flaws in the 
negotiated terms that might interfere with the smooth operation of the transaction. 
The lawyers role is not to advise each party with respect to matters specific to 
that party, but all understand that the lawyer may suggest modifications that are 
helpful to one party and not adverse to the others. 
When the lawyer accepts the engagement, she is mindful of the rules of legal 
ethics. She cautions the parties that she represents none of them individually and 
intends to remain neutral. The lawyer tells the clients that she will continue to act 
only so long as the parties define the terms of the deal and reconcile any 
differences they may have with one another without her intervention. She will 
withdraw from common representation and will not represent any party if the 
parties come into conflict with one another.64 Thus, the lawyer avoids the conflict 
of interest prohibitions on representing multiple parties. 
One finds, however, that the strictness of the representation limits is far more 
fluid than the description in the preceding paragraph would suggest. Frequently, 
the lawyer becomes a mediator among the parties without her role becoming 
defined as mediator. Sometimes, perhaps regularly, the lawyer continues to act for 
one party while the others either act for themselves or secure separate 
representation.65 Frequently, the lawyer, possibly inadvertently, represents one 
party over the others because she has existing information about that party that 
causes her to see that partys position and legal needs more clearly than those of 
other parties. While all this fluidity may conflict with or violate the ethical rules 
set forth in the Model Rules, the nature of law practice, human nature, and the 
specific representational context make the fluidity inevitable. 
62 Model Rule 1.7 permits the lawyer to represent multiple parties under limited 
circumstances, or, more generally, with their informed consent. MODEL RULES OF PROFL 
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002). 
63 As defined infra in Part VII.A, a scrivener prepares legal documents according to a 
clients instruction without rendering legal advice (other than as to the form of the 
documentation). It is unlikely that a lawyer could argue successfully in a disciplinary or 
malpractice context that she rendered no legal advice at all. Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 
78081, sees acting as scrivener as a form of intermediation under withdrawn Model Rule 2.2 
so that all parties are clients to whom the lawyer renders advice. 
64 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7(a), 1.9 (2002). 
65 Generally, the lawyer either will withdraw if the transactional disagreements between or 
among the parties lead to litigation, or the lawyer will secure a waiver of the conflict from the 
parties she will not continue to represent so that she may continue to represent one party. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.9(a), (b) (2002). Many lawyers are reluctant to 
become the lawyer for the deal unless all parties recognize that the lawyer will continue to 
represent one party, rather than withdrawing, if disagreements arise. The lawyer must protect 
her source of revenue. 
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Clients opt for a single lawyer to prepare the documentation for the deal in 
order to avoid the economic inefficiency of multiple lawyers. One party generally 
suggests engaging the services of an attorney with whom that party already has a 
relationship.66 The lawyer may be representing the client simultaneously on one 
or more other matters.67 Perhaps the attorney is much in demand and the client 
assumes that he will gain increased access to the lawyer as the client brings the 
lawyer more business. Perhaps the client assumes that by using a lawyer with 
whom the client has a relationship, the lawyer, while remaining substantially 
neutral, will look out for the clients interests (and the client may be correct in that 
assumption). Other parties to the transaction may prefer their own attorneys but 
yield to the party who leads the deal or invests the greatest amount of capital into 
the deal. Thus, selection of the lawyer for the situation may be a function of 
power disparity among the parties to the transaction, as the client exploits his 
power advantage to insist upon the lawyer he thinks will be best for him. 
From the attorneys perspective, refusing common representation is 
impractical. As much as she may wish the protection that separate representation 
may afford her, it is likely that she either will accept common representation or 
will end up with no part in the representation. In the absence of existing conflicts 
among the clients, she is unlikely to be able to convince them that each needs 
separate counsel. Failure to accept the engagement may lead her historical client 
to look elsewhere for general representation. The lawyer who becomes the lawyer 
for the deal has an opportunity to capture the general representation of each party. 
Thus, if the attorney declines the engagement, she may lose a client, but if she 
accepts the engagement, her business may gain new clients. So the lawyer 
resolves her dilemma by accepting the engagementhoping that the deal will 
work out and the parties will not become adversaries. 
As to the lawyers neutrality, it may be more aspiration than practicality.68
The parties should define the terms of their own deal. If the terms upon which the 
parties agree affect the lawyers historical client adversely, and the client is 
unaware of the adverse impact, the lawyer will inform the historical client. A 
66 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 803 (seeing the lawyers prior representation of one of 
the parties as a serious impediment to the lawyers representation of multiple parties including 
that prior client because of loyalty and confidentiality concerns). 
67 Law firms with multiple lawyers may have the luxury to allocate different lawyers to 
different tasks so that the lawyer acting for the situation may not be involved with other matters 
involving the client who refers the business. Whether or not such firms successfully isolate the 
lawyer for the situation from other matters for the same client through Chinese walls is 
questionable. See discussion infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
68 Model Rules 1.7 and 1.8 characterize neutrality as a matter of loyalty and the ability 
to exercise independent judgment of behalf of a client. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL 
CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8, & cmts. (2002). The informed consent of all clients permits the 
lawyer to proceed with the representation. Comments to the cited Model Rules are 
cautionary and alert a lawyer to conflicts of loyalty. Id.
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lawyer simply does not remain silent about such matters and allow her client to 
proceed with a disadvantageous transactional structure. The better the lawyer 
knows the client, and the more important the client is to the lawyers revenue 
stream, the more likely it is that the lawyer will be sensitive to the general 
business, economic, and tax needs of that client. The attorney may be willing to 
provide similar service to the other parties to the transaction but, without the 
historical relationship, she may not be aware of matters that affect the other 
parties adversely.  
If conflicts among the parties arise, the lawyer for the deal will not withdraw 
immediately. Fundamental to any successful business practice is focus on 
completing the transaction. Business lawyers explore variant structures, seek to 
find common ground, and bring the transaction to fruition. Withdrawal from 
representation as soon as conflicts arise is inconsistent with successful 
lawyering.69 Only when one or more of the other parties engages separate counsel 
will the common representation cease. Even then, the lawyer is likely to continue 
her involvement in the transaction in an unclearly defined capacity, but in which 
her primary focus is, possibly inadvertently, on the interests of her historical 
client.70
Continuing involvement by the attorney who represented multiple clients 
after some of the original clients engage separate counsel is also routine in 
business settings. Efficiencies lead business clients who anticipate that they will 
obtain separate representation before they complete the transaction to begin the 
process with a single lawyer. The lawyer will prepare the first drafts of the 
transaction agreement and the parties will negotiate as many of the basic terms as 
they can with the one lawyer involved. Then each party will engage separate 
counsel (except the one who brought the initial lawyer to the table) to review the 
contract on his behalf and recommend modifications for the specific party. All 
parties anticipate from the outset that the initial lawyer will continue to represent 
69 See Bassett, supra note 21, at 435 (characterizing the risk of conflicts and 
disqualification as an unavoidable and costly risk of joint representation). 
70 While there appears to be neither statistics nor other empirical study of withdrawal in 
the course of multiple client representation, anecdotal evidence suggests that lawyers, perhaps 
primarily for economic reasons, tend not to withdraw in many instances in which Model Rule 
1.7 and its commentary would require withdrawal. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 
1.7 & cmt. (2002). Bar associations neither solicit nor collect information on attorney 
withdrawal in office practice, but the ABA PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 1996
1999, supra note 58, at 12, discloses that about 3% of claims involve improper withdrawal from 
representation (probably not failure to withdraw following common representation) while some 
5% involve conflicts of interest. Some portion of the conflicts claims may involve failure to 
withdraw under circumstances that Model Rule 1.7 requires. MODEL RULES OF PROFL 
CONDUCT R. 1.7 & cmt. (2002). 
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the party who introduced her to the group so no one objects to the continuing 
involvement of the original lawyer.71
Chinese wall techniques,72 that large law firms use to isolate the attorney 
handling the multiple client matter from other firm representation of one of the 
parties, do little to ameliorate conflict of interest concerns. It is likely, and 
certainly understandable, that the attorney who has primary responsibility for the 
specific client will provide the attorney managing the matter with sufficient 
background information on the client to prevent the managing attorney from 
drafting documents adverse to that clients interests. While the Chinese wall 
concept may comfort other participants in the deal, the Model rules do not 
sanction it as a means to avoid conflicts of interest.73
A single lawyer (or firm) acting for all parties to a transaction is a common 
occurrence. Small business representation often places the companys lawyer in 
the position of looking out for the interests of the various participants.74 The 
practice of multiple party representation, with or without a primary client, is 
customary in family business representation,75 estate planning for family 
groups,76 and even more adversarial situations such as divorce settlements.77 In 
all these cases, the Model Rules accommodate the representation but impose strict 
constraints that rely on the clients informed, written consent to initiate 
representation and the lawyers withdrawal from representation if certain serious 
71 See the description of Brandeis representation of the tannery bankruptcy in HAZARD, 
JR., ET AL., supra note 53, at 635. 
72 Participants in the investment banking sector frequently apply the term Chinese wall 
to describe internal control systems that separate their underwriting from their brokerage 
functions to preclude transfer of information on pending offerings that might involve the 
brokerage function in insider trading. Accounting firms use the term to refer to separation of 
their audit from other client services functions to protect the independence of the audit function. 
The term refers, of course, to the Great Wall of China that Chinese emperors had their subjects 
build to keep out the barbarians. As Franz Kafka ironically noted in his story, Beim Bau der 
Chinesischen Mauer (The Chinese Wall), it was impossible to undertake a vast project like the 
wall without leaving gaps. FRANZ KAFKA, SÄMTLICHE ERZÄHLUNGEN 289 (1969) (translated in 
FRANZ KAFKA, THE COMPLETE STORIES 235 (1971)). While the project united the populace, it 
provided inadequate protection to the kingdom from the peoples of the north. Id.
73 Model Rule 1.10 treats all firm members alike with respect to disqualification in 
conflict situations. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2002). But note that Model 
Rule 1.9(c) focuses on use of former client information. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL 
CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (2002). The Chinese wall might provide the lawyer not involved in the 
specific representation with the argument that he had no knowledge of the client matter and the 
information that the firm may have is not imputed to him.  
74 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 75760. 
75 Id.
76 See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics in Estate Planning and Fiduciary Administration: The 
Inadequacy of the Model Rules and the Model Code, 45 REC. ASSN B. CITY N.Y. 715 (1990). 
77 Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 75760. 
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conflicts of interest arise in the course of representation.78 Yet, probably relatively 
few lawyers comply with the strict guidelines. They know their clients and their 
clients know and trust them. Often the clients prefer the lawyer in the conflict 
situation to a new attorney who neither knows the relationships among the parties, 
nor is sensitive to the groups common issues. In those instances, in which the 
lawyer has represented one party but not the others, the other parties regularly 
find that the representation, albeit unavoidably, is somewhat slanted in favor of 
the historical client, is nevertheless satisfactory for their needs too.  
As peculiar as the observation may be that non-neutral, multiple client 
representation is acceptable, it makes sense if one is able to step back from the 
customary dichotomy of neutrality/advocacy. Where parties are working together 
toward completion of a defined transaction objective, they need neither a neutral 
arbiter to make decisions for them, nor a zealous advocate to represent them. The 
lawyer facilitates but does not define their relationship. Unlike litigation 
representation, in which the lawyer assumes a primary operational role, the 
lawyer in the transactional context is incidental to the parties and the transaction.  
Moreover, a lawyer representing multiple parties cannot be a zealot. Multiple 
party representation forces the attorney to accommodate known interests of all 
parties, rather than advocating for a single party, lest she destroy what otherwise 
might become a successful business venture. While the lawyer may be familiar 
with the interests of one party, and able to address those interests in the course of 
the representation, she generally listens carefully to each party and seeks to learn 
what the other parties needs are as well.  
In fact, the other parties may be better off with the multiple party 
representation model than separate representation. Separate representation does 
not prevent the party with the superior bargaining power from dictating the terms 
of the deal. In that context, the lawyer for the party with superior bargaining 
power may have no compunction about the deal terms because the other parties 
have their own representation and understand the terms. On the other hand, 
multiple party representation may soften demands for harsh or one-sided terms. 
When the historical client wishes to treat the other parties unfairly, the lawyer is 
ideally situated to prevent overreaching. The client understands the conflict and 
the limitations that the rules of conduct impose upon the lawyer. The lawyer is 
well situated to be a voice of reason that coaxes and cajoles the client to do right 
so that the lawyer does not have to disclose the issue79 to the other clients and 
possibly withdraw from representation.  
78 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002). 
79 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (explaining that disclosure 
would be fundamental to multiple party representation and implicit in the 
engagement).
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The lawyer for the transaction may be the very model for the ethics of care 
that a number of commentators recommend to the legal profession.80 She 
balances the competing interests of multiple clients in order to complete her task. 
She operates marginally outside the constraints of current ethical rules. The 
clients accept the limitations of the attorneys role in order to accomplish their 
common goals efficiently and with as little animosity as possible.  
IV. CLIENTS AND OTHER CONSTITUENCIES
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules emphasize that the lawyer be 
loyal to the client.81 The Model Rules require the lawyer to pursue the clients 
objectives diligently,82 competently83 and without conflicts of interest.84 The 
Model Code requires that the lawyer not [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to 
him.85 Further the lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds 
of the law,86 pursue the clients lawful objectives,87 and avoid conflicts of 
interest.88 The Model Rules specifically assign to the client the privilege to 
determine the objectives of representation within provisions noted in the rule.89
But while the lawyers obligation of loyalty is clear, the identity of the client may 
be uncertain. 
In litigation practice, the clients identity and, accordingly, the object of the 
lawyers loyalty, is usually unambiguous.90 Most of the time, the term client 
embraces the individual who engages the lawyer and agrees to pay the lawyers 
fee. In non-litigation practice, where the lawyer represents affluent clients who 
deal exclusively with others that can afford and are willing to pay for legal 
services, identity of the client is similarly transparent. Less transparent is the 
identity of the client when the lawyer represents multiple parties in a transactional 
or family context. The lawyer owes duties to several individuals and must balance 
80 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
81 MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1986); MODEL RULES OF PROFL 
CONDUCT R. 1.7 & cmt. 1 (2002). 
82 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002). 
83 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002). 
84 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002). 
85 MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) (1986). 
86 MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1986). 
87 MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1986). 
88 MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1, 5-2 (1986). 
89 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002). 
90 Representation of organizations might create some ambiguity even in litigation 
contexts. See discussion infra in text accompanying notes 18189. 
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their interests because all have engaged her and contribute to payment of her 
fee.91
Sometimes, however, even in cases where all parties can afford 
representation, the client is not the individual who engages the lawyer or agrees to 
pay the fee. An individual or an entity may engage the lawyer to represent a third 
party. Examples include one spouse engaging a lawyer to prepare a will for the 
other spouse (or wills for both spouses),92 a parent engaging a lawyer to represent 
her child in the purchase of a house, a sole shareholder engaging a lawyer to 
represent the corporation, an entity engaging a lawyer to represent a member of 
management, etc. In such cases, one may identify the client in terms of the 
lawyers duties, rather than a person who engages her and pays her fee. However, 
despite the culture of zeal and its focus on the client, lawyers seem to owe some 
duties to other constituencies even under current rules of conduct. 
Although the Model Code and the Model Rules assume that the lawyer 
interacts both with clients and non-clients, they express no specific duties to non-
clients. At the same time, lawyers have rather amorphous general obligations to 
the world at large: [a] lawyer . . . is a representative of clients, an officer of the 
legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
justice.93 The drafters of the Model Rules recognized that a lawyers obligations 
to non-clients might be a function of the degree and quality of representation that 
the non-client receives: 
A lawyers responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal 
system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing 
party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client 
and at the same time assume that justice is being done.94
The statement is incomplete. It does not provide specific guidance for those 
instances in which the opposing party is not well represented, not represented at 
all, or even is unknown.  
Non-litigation practice is replete with instances of a lawyers actions affecting 
people who are not the lawyers direct client and who are unrepresented, 
underrepresented, and often unknown.95 Lawyers draft documents and structure 
transactions that have direct impact on the well being of many people who are 
non-clients in most traditional views of the client/non-client split. This Article 
91 See supra Part III. 
92 See Pennell, supra note 76, at 71923 (discussing the ethical issues arising in such 
estate planning contexts). 
93 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2002). 
94 Id. at pmbl. ¶ 7. 
95 See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169, 
19194 (1997). 
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argues that impact and power to offset or avoid adverse impact, rather than 
narrow definitions of client, should determine whether or not the lawyer owes a 
duty to the affected person. Instead of dividing the lawyers world into clients and 
non-clients, the correct division should be into three categories: direct clients, 
other constituencies to which the lawyer owes duties,96 and other constituencies 
to which the lawyer owes no duties.  
Clients are those who engage the lawyer or who define the subject of the 
legal representation. Constituencies to which the lawyer owes no duty are (1) 
those that the legal representation does not affect and (2) those that enjoy 
significant bargaining power and separate representation.97 All other 
constituencies are those that the lawyer may anticipate that the legal 
representation will affect and that cannot protect themselves from the adverse 
impacts of decisions made in the course of the representation.98 Lawyers should 
owe a duty to consider the impact of their representation on those other, 
inadequately protected constituencies. Lawyers should strive to do no harm99 to 
them. Courts have applied this notion in defining the fiduciary duties of directors 
to corporations100 and majority shareholders to minority shareholders.101 Such a 
96 These would be indirect or quasi-clients of some sort.  
97 In the absence of bargaining power, separate representation is illusory. 
98 Commentators have discussed the issue of third party beneficiaries of legal 
representation extensively in the estate planning area. See, e.g., Hazard, Jr., supra note 58, at 
98688 (arguing that privity should not bar estate beneficiaries from asserting claims against the 
estate planning lawyer); Bradley E.S. Fogel, Attorney v. ClientPrivity, Malpractice, and the 
Lack of Respect for the Primacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate Planning, 68 
TENN. L. REV. 261, 326 (2001) (arguing for protecting the attorney-client relationship by 
barring such claims in all but exceptional cases); Henry M. Ordower, Trusting Our Partners: 
An Essay on Resetting the Estate Planning Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 313, 340 (1996) (arguing that in estate planning contexts wives often appear to be 
direct clients but their representation becomes subservient to the husbands representation, 
leaving her little more representation than unrepresented third parties). 
99 This is a customary and loose paraphrase of the Hippocratic Oath. The paraphrase 
corresponds to: I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a 
suggestion to this effect. LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, 
AND INTERPRETATION 3 (Henry E. Sigerist ed., 1943). THE WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 
DECLARATION OF GENEVA (1948), PHYSICIAN'S OATH (adopted by the General Assembly of the 
World Medical Association, Geneva, Switzerland, September 1948 and amended by the 22nd 
World Medical Assembly, Sydney, Australia, August 1968) reads in part, [E]ven under threat, 
I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity. The physicians oath 
paraphrase may be a good point of reference for lawyers as well as doctors.  
100 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
101 See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969) (involving a majority of 
shareholders creating a holding company to facilitate trading in the underlying operating 
company, but failing to invite the minority to exchange shares of the operating company for 
shares of the holding company); Singer v. Magnovox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del. 1977) 
(involving a freeze out merger). 
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duty would require lawyers to balance dissonant, often competing interests, in 
order to generate fairly distributed102 results in which clients do not overreach 
others whom the representation will affect.  
A model of multiple client representation would acknowledge and give form 
to an attorneys broader obligations to more than her direct and immediate client 
under the ethical standards. The new rule would permit wide latitude in multiple 
client representation and extend that model to protect the interests of other 
affected constituencies. The standard will have to develop over time and integrate 
the thoughts of many experts. An initial draft of the standard might be:  
Rule. Multiple Client RepresentationOther Constituencies. Lawyers may 
represent multiple clients whenever the relationship of the clients suggests that it 
would be less efficient economically, personally, or both economically and 
personally for each client to employ separate counsel. For example, multiple 
party representation may be appropriate when the clients (i) have a common 
business objective with respect to the representation and a willingness to work 
out differences between or among them or (ii) are members of a family or other 
group having a unifying non-familial relationship. Similarly, multiple party 
representation is appropriate when one party is so dominant, economically or 
personally, that the other parties lack effective bargaining power such that their 
power would not increase materially as a function of separate representation. A 
lawyer representing multiple clients shall seek to balance the interests of all 
parties in achieving the objectives of the representation.  
Sub-rule 1. General EngagementsUninstructed Lawyering.103 A lawyer who 
makes recommendations to clients on courses of legal action without specific 
and detailed instructions from the client should not encourage a client to exploit 
the clients power to the detriment of others. Rather, the lawyer should treat the 
client representation as multiple party representation, and ensure that other 
constituencies that the representation will impact are also treated as if they were 
clients under the general language of the Rule. Accordingly, the lawyer shall 
evaluate the impact that a specific legal course of conduct will have on other 
constituencies, balance the interests of the client and other affected 
constituencies, and recommend legal courses of action that reasonably serve the 
client without harming others materially. 
Sub-rule 2. Instructed Lawyering. When a client engages the lawyer to follow a 
legal course of action that, following careful evaluation of the impact the action 
has upon other constituencies, the lawyer concludes will harm others materially, 
the lawyer should strive to persuade the client to modify or abandon the course 
of legal action to limit or obviate the harm to others. When the client will not 
abandon or modify a plan in order to diminish harm to other constituencies, the 
lawyer may decline to assist the client to accomplish the clients objectives 
whether or not those objectives may be lawful.  
102 See infra Part VI (discussing fairness). 
103 See infra Part VII.BC (discussing entrepreneur and architect lawyers).  
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Sub-rule 3. Nature of Evaluation under Sub-rules 1 and 2. In applying sub-rules 
1 and 2 and the general language of the rule, the lawyer should not limit 
evaluation to economic analysis of quantifiable costs and benefits. Accordingly, 
proposals for legal courses of action and modifications to actions that lawyers 
recommend may limit appropriately the clients (and the lawyers) economic 
gain even though the limitation does not increase the economic benefit (or 
diminish an economic detriment) to others commensurately. Thus, evaluation 
should include factors that are difficult to quantify, such as, self-esteem of 
affected parties and the reputation and status in the community of all affected 
parties, including the client and the lawyer. 
Sub-rule 4. Non-application where no Power Disparity. When other affected 
constituencies have adequate representation and sufficient bargaining power to 
prevent harm to them, the lawyer may represent the client zealously without 
balancing interests. Thus, this rule generally will not apply to most litigation but 
may apply to pre-litigation preparation and settlement negotiation.  
Sub-rule 5. Confidential Information. If, in order to accomplish the goals this rule 
sets forth, the lawyer must become privy to confidences of one or more persons 
who are not clients, the lawyer may assure each such person of protection of the 
confidence. 
The proposed formulation of the rule is amorphous,104 but current standards 
of conduct are no less so. Within the conflict of interest limitations,105 the Model 
Rules anticipate that attorneys will represent multiple clients but provide only a 
broad outline for fulfilling that role.106 In addition, the Model Rules contemplate 
broader non-representational roles, including intermediation,107 to compel the 
attorney to monitor the relationship for conflicts so that the lawyer will withdraw 
at the appropriate moment if withdrawal becomes necessary.108 More generally, 
current standards offer a limited array of specific rules and leave the difficult 
decisions,109 when the attorney-client relationship is ambiguous, for the lawyer to 
104 See Vukowich, supra note 44, at 85356 (proposing a standard requiring lawyers to 
consider counter-party interests in standard forms). Vukowich proposes the standard despite the 
uncertainties such a standard would entail for the lawyer. Id.; see also discussion infra Part 
VII.C. 
105 See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
106 Id.
107 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 3 (2002).
108 See id.; see Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 799801 (discussing these issues in the 
context of now withdrawn Model Rule 2.2). 
109 See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29 (2002).
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resolve.110 The Model Rules observe that they provide only a framework for the 
ethical practice of law.111
V. ETHICS DISCOURSE TRENDS
Focus on other constituencies permeates the extensive discourse concerning 
the scope of legal ethics that continues even after the ABAs 1980 adoption of the 
Model Rules. At least one commentator expressed regret that, by eliminating the 
three-tier structure of canon, ethical consideration, and disciplinary rule that 
characterized the Model Code, the Model Rules lost the aspirational anchor to the 
rules of conduct.112 Other commentators emphasize the inadequacy of ethical 
codes or rules for specific practice areas.113 Much of the discussion concerning 
specialized codes involves either ambiguities in identifying the client or the 
relationship between the lawyer and others whose interests the lawyer reasonably 
may anticipate her representation will affect.114 Attention to the effects on, and 
needs of, individuals who are not the lawyers primary, direct clients is an issue 
that both proponents of separate ethics rules for specific practice areas and 
proponents of the ethics of care emphasize.115 This article suggests that traditional 
multiple party representation offers an ethical model satisfactory to the 
specialized codes line and the ethics of care line of the legal ethics debate.  
A. Proliferating Codes of Ethics
An important trend in the legal ethics discourse relates to the inadequacy of a 
single set of rules to govern all practice areas. Commentators observe that the 
complexities of disparate areas of practice do not lend themselves to resolution 
with either the Model Code or the Model Rules. Professor Lorne, for example, 
emphasized the inadequacy of the Model Code in the context of a securities law 
practice where the attorney prepares public disclosure documents for the client.116
110 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002) (requiring lawyers 
representing organizations to reconcile the demands of management with the interests of the 
entity itself and the shareholders); see also discussion infra text accompanying notes 18195.  
111 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 16 (2002). 
112 See, e.g., Krane, supra note 31, at 32728. 
113 See infra notes 11826 and accompanying text. 
114 See infra Part V.A.  
115 See infra Part V.B. 
116 See generally Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public 
Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423 (1978). Section 5 of the Securities Act 
of 1933, as amended, prohibits an issuer of securities from offering its securities to the public 
without disclosing in a prospectus all information that would be material to a prospective 
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In the National Student Marketing investigation,117 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission claimed that counsel owed a duty to the public investors to assure 
that disclosure documents were complete and accurate. Lorne argues that 
ambiguity as to the identification of the client in that context is troubling and 
precludes efficient application of the ethical rules.118 Attorneys would be unable 
to meet the demand that they advocate for the client because the client consists of 
many diverse interests. Under the SECs argument, the client may include the 
purchasers of securities, the board of directors, management, and others whom 
the lawyers activities affected. In many cases, the various clients interests differ 
from one another. The common view of the client as the corporation itself is 
unsatisfactory because the corporations board of directors always would need 
separate counsel.119 Lorne sees a need for a separate Code of Professional 
Advisorial Responsibility.120 Some years after Lornes article, Stanley Sporkin 
argued that the Model Rules did not solve Lornes problem with the Code.121
Sporkin averred that a separate code is needed for corporate and securities 
practice because of the lawyers obligations to a mix of interested parties, 
including shareholders and the public.122
According to Professor Pennell, both the Model Code and the Model Rules 
are similarly inadequate to an estate planning practice.123 Through discussion of a 
series of common problems arising in estate planning, Pennell identifies various 
areas of the estate planning practice in which interests of people other than the 
immediate client take on commanding importance to the lawyers activities on 
behalf of the client.124 Professor Zacharias expands on the concept of multiple 
party responsibilities with the notion that lawyers should consider the interests of 
third parties and the society at large in the course of representing a client.125
investor. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e, § 77a77aa (2003). Preparation of the prospectus is a 
collaborative process involving the issuer, accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers. See id.
117 SEC v. Natl Student Mktg. Corp., [19771978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 96,027 (D.D.C. May 2, 1977) (reporting on the partial settlement in the case). 
118 Lorne, supra note 116, at 47778. 
119 Id. at 43738. 
120 Id. at 490.  
121 Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the 
Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149, 15052 (1993). 
122 Id. at 152. 
123 Pennell, supra note 76, at 716.  
124 Id. For a discussion of the lawyers exposure to malpractice claims by non-clients and 
the argument that privity with the client should not preclude such actions, see Hazard, Jr., supra
note 58, at 992. And for the contrary view, see Fogel, supra note 98, at 323. 
125 See Zacharias, supra note 95, at 175. 
2003] MODERATING POWER DISPARITY 1287 
Zacharias also emphasizes the need for particularized rules that are tailored to the 
nature of the lawyers practice.126
B. Ethics of Care
A second significant trend in the legal ethics discourse involves efforts to 
understand and reconcile the tension between rights-based and care-based models 
for legal representation. This discussion deepened through the last two decades of 
the twentieth century as women entered law schools and law practice in 
increasing numbers.127 Carol Gilligans book spurred the discourse.128 Gilligan 
argued that moral and psychological developmental theory derived from studies 
of males only.129 Study of females would have offered different perspectives and 
led to other theories that emphasized interpersonal relations and caring for others 
rather than male-oriented hierarchies and universal principles.130
Legal commentators adapted Gilligans observations to the study of the 
structure of law practice and legal ethics to develop the concept of an 
ethic of care.131 Departing from Gilligans example of the Heinz 
126 See id. at 20409. 
127 Women are expected to be the majority of first-year law students this fall [2001], 
compared with just 10% in 1970, and almost 50% of the 43,518 students who started law 
school last fall. Sarah Stewart Taylor, Womens Numbers in Professional Schools Still Low, at
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/628/context/archive (Aug. 23, 2001); see 
also Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 31418 (2000). 
128 See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
AND WOMENS DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
129 See generally id. Gilligans thesis has been the subject of much criticism as well. For 
example, Linda K. Kerber, Some Cautionary Words for Historians, 11 SIGNS 304, 309 (1986), 
criticizes Gilligan for oversimplification and for misdirecting focus toward biological 
differences between men and women. See also Catherine G. Greeno & Eleanor E. Maccoby, 
How Different Is the Different Voice?, 11 SIGNS 310, 315 (1986) (pointing out a lack of 
qualitative support for conclusions); cf. Carol Gilligan, Reply, 11 SIGNS 324 (1986) (responding 
to Greeno and Maccobys observations). Gilligan has retreated somewhat from her starkest 
observations. See Carol Gilligan, Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE 
MORAL DOMAIN xviixix (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988). 
130 See GILLIGAN, supra note 128, at 18. 
131 See, e.g., Robin L. West, The Difference in Womens Hedonic Lives: A 
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMENS L.J. 81, 81 (1987) 
(emphasizing fundamental differences between men and women, with women emphasizing 
relationships and care rather than rights); CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 3839 (1987) (criticizing the derivation of the ethic of care from 
womens subservient role); Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We 
Claim A Different Voice?, 15 HARV. WOMENS L.J. 37, 5060 (1992) (viewing Gilligans 
book as either conservative or progressive and directs scholars to draw out the books 
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dilemma,132 one commentator suggests that the lawyering process might look 
quite different if women rather than men fixed its rules.133 She observes that 
women tend to look less to clear answers of right or wrong but seek to find a 
solution to problems that would be satisfactory to all.134 Menkel-Meadow 
considers the possibility of transformation of lawyering as increasing numbers of 
women enter practice but worries that women may not alter the profession, as 
they will subscribe to the mens rules under which they received their training.135
Another commentator sees the ethic of care as consistent with advocacy for a 
client136 because the lawyer has the connection and context to direct and motivate 
the client as the lawyer gains insight into the clients world.137 While no one has 
adapted the terminology of an ethic of care to business representation, business 
lawyers place great store in gaining insight into their clients businesses and 
thought processes in order to design suitable representation. 
Ethics discourse trends as disparate as the development of specialized rules 
for each practice area and a shift from rights-based rules to an ethics of care have 
much in common. Both discussions spotlight multiple interests in representation 
as opposed to the readily identifiable client. Commentators have become 
concerned with effects of the lawyers and the clients actions and decisions upon 
progressive features); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 531 
(Patricia Smith ed., 1993) (considering the negative implications for women of associating an 
ethic of care with women).  
132 GILLIGAN, supra note 128, at 2431, observes that an eleven year old boy and an 
eleven year old girl respond differently to Heinzs dilemma. Heinzs wife is dying of cancer but 
Heinz cannot afford the needed medication. Asked whether Heinz may steal the drug, the boy 
made a rights-based analysis and concluded that Heinz would be justified. The girl sought to 
find an alternative solution by suggesting negotiation between the druggist and Heinz. The girl 
chose caring and interpersonal relationship building to rights analysis.  
133 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Womens 
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMENS L.J. 39, 49 (1985).  
134 Id. Successful business lawyers often subscribe to a slightly different formulation of 
this concept. They believe that the lawyer should never recommend terms that will be 
unacceptable to the counter-party to the deal, but should propose terms that accommodate the 
interests of the counter-party in order to bring the transaction to completion acceptable to their 
own clients. They understand that they must identify what is most important to their own client 
and the counter-party and leave those matters static and not subject to negotiation while 
everything else is negotiable. 
135 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 133, at 50. 
136 Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665, 2715 
(1993). 
137 Id. at 2695. 
2003] MODERATING POWER DISPARITY 1289 
non-clients,138 intended beneficiaries of the attorneys efforts on behalf of the 
client,139 multiple clients,140 and clients of ambiguous identity.141
VI. POWER DISPARITY, THE LAWYERS ROLE IN ITS EXPLOITATION, AND 
DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS
Assorted guises of power disparities play varying roles in relationship to 
lawyers intervention. Occasionally, physical power plays a role in the legal 
system. Intimidation, for example, deters individuals with legally significant 
information from making that information available. Similarly, victims of abuse 
fail to testify against or seek legal protections from their abusers. But despite such 
examples, physical power disparities affect the American system of justice only to 
a very limited degree. In office practice, physical intimidation is likely to be of 
only minor significance. Furthermore, existing ethical rules clearly preclude the 
lawyer from participating in the clients intimidation of a third party.142
In contrast, economic power disparities assume a far greater role in United 
States law. For example, employers historically controlled the terms and 
conditions of employment. Many employers offered low wages and poor working 
conditions to their employees. Lawyers played a crucial role for employers in 
structuring unbalanced employment contracts and in lobbying to prevent the 
legislatures from intervening on behalf of workers.143 Recognition of the 
significance of that economic power disparity led to unionization, as employees 
sought power balance.144 Unionization counter-balanced the employers power 
and led to improved wages and working conditions.145 Occasionally, as the 
power balance shifted to the unions, union leaders abused the unions 
138 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 133, at 5055. 
139 See, e.g., Pennell, supra note 76. 
140 See, e.g., Lorne, supra note 116. 
141 See, e.g., id.; Sporkin, supra note 121. 
142 Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits the lawyer from assisting the client in criminal activity, 
and physical intimidation often constitutes the crime of assault. MODEL RULES OF PROFL 
CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002). 
143 See generally ANTHONY WOODIWISS, RIGHTS V. CONSPIRACY: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF LABOUR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1990) (explaining the 
sociology of power relationship in management-labor relations). 
144 The findings and policies underlying the NRLA are to foster collective bargaining in 
order to eliminate part of the imbalance in bargaining power between employers and 
employees. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2003). 
145 Id. The inequality of bargaining power [that unionization offsets] . . . tends to 
aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of 
wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and 
working conditions within and between industries. Id.
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consolidated power to gain personal advantages or to destroy businesses.146 Even 
when legislation prohibited employers from engaging in specific anti-labor 
activities,147 lawyers helped, and possibly motivated, employers to comply with 
the letter, but not necessarily the spirit, of the law.148
Economic power is a broad concept. Whenever someone controls a limited 
resource, the control bestows economic power. Resource control enables the 
holder to impose terms of supply upon others who wish access to the resource. 
For example, a small town grocer may enjoy monopolistic power over grocery 
prices in the town and charge far higher prices than a supermarket in a big city.149
Informational power disparities also play a vital role in enabling the power 
holder to wield economic power. On a simple level, auction-type markets with 
time sensitive conditions that preclude the buyer from assembling value 
information tend to exploit informational power disparities. One example might 
be souvenir shopping in popular tourist destinations, where the buyer has little 
time and pricing is a function of bargaining with the vendor.150 Similarly, before 
information on dealers costs became public, pricing of automobiles depended 
upon the consumers lack of information, which enabled the automobile dealer to 
control the price negotiation.  
As consumers become better educated as to pricing mechanisms, either as a 
function of individual education or as the market assimilates data, consumers 
sometimes learn to be patient and wait for the lowest price at which the seller will 
be willing to sell. At the same time, informational power disparity is often a 
function of economic power disparity. The person with better or more complete 
146 Id. Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor 
organizations . . . have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing 
commerce . . . . Id. See, for example, discussion of the Genovese family takeover of Local 560 
in Clyde W. Summers, Union Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
689, 69192 (1991). 
147 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2003). 
148 Consider the plant closing to avoid unionization that violated section 8(a)(3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), in Textile Workers Union of America v. 
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965), that might have withstood challenge had 
counsel constructed a better argument for business purpose. See generally Note, The Liability of 
Labor Relations Consultants for Advising Unfair Labor Practices, 97 HARV. L. REV. 529 
(1983). 
149 Economists observe that monopolistic power is generally relative to and a function of 
barriers to entry. If the price becomes too high, barriers to entry that permitted monopolistic 
power in the monopolized market cease to deter competition, or potential consumers of the item 
either find a substitute or a less convenient source of supply. Moreover, the small town grocer 
may have to charge higher prices if he is unable to capture economies of scale that are available 
to the supermarket. 
150 Of course, the buyer may not have much interest in the pricing when the souvenir 
items are low cost and the buyer is in a free-spending mode on vacation. 
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information may have or have had access to education, advisors, and 
informational resources commensurate with her economic power.  
Power disparities also may be a function of societal, family or other group 
structures that allow one person to restrict access to group resources. For example, 
religious leaders regularly wield power that is disproportional to their physical 
strength or wealth because group members believe them to have informational 
superiority. Clergy have the power to deliver or withhold societal approval.151
Similarly, in many cultures, a fathers decisions govern the family even if the 
decisions are obviously unjust or unreasonable.152
Attorneys regularly play a role in facilitating, encouraging, and even 
motivating their clients exploitation of power disparities.153 That role, however 
small, presents the issue of the propriety of lending ones skills to the use and 
abuse of power. Professor Menkel-Meadow154 recommends teaching the ethic of 
care to sensitize lawyers (and clients) to the interests, concerns, and effects their 
actions have on third parties, particularly when they abuse power. Menkel-
Meadow suggests placing the lawyer in the position of the opponent in order to 
ask the question: Would I want this done to me?155
Consider, for example, onerous contractual provisions. The legal culture of 
zeal, fortified with law and economics, well may lead the lawyer to seek 
enforcement for her client. Without considering the power differential that 
permitted the provisions to become part of the contract, the lawyer may see only 
the net benefit to her client, rather than her clients priorities.156
Traditional, and possibly superficial, application of law and economics 
principles supports enforcement and exploitation of the power advantage. 
Lawyers commonly understand law and economics to mandate a simple 
balancing of measurable costs and benefits that emanate from existing legal rules 
151 And possibly even certain eternal benefitsif the belief system in the culture assigns 
such control to clergy. 
152 See generally LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, BEYOND PATRIARCHY: JEWISH FATHERS AND 
FAMILIES 2223 (2000) (describing family structure and blind adherence to paternal decisions); 
see also PATRIARCHY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WOMENS POSITIONS AT THE END OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Valentine M. Moghadam ed., 1996) (collecting essays). 
153 Ordower, supra note 98, at 315; cf. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, JR., supra note 25, at 514 
(comparing the role of the lawyer to that of the Godfather).  
154 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and 
Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 75, 10910 (1994). 
155 Id. at 109 (internal citations omitted). Menkel-Meadow certainly intends the question 
to include: Would I want this done to my child, spouse, parent, etc.? One may trivialize 
Menkel-Meadows question by noting that the question restates the Golden Rule, and 
Menkel-Meadow would wish lawyers to apply the Golden Rule. Recent cultural studies 
suggest, however, that the Golden Rule informs behavior unless one has learned not to apply it. 
See generally Bower, supra note 26 and discussion infra in text accompanying note 175. 
156 Cf. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, JR., supra note 25, at 514. 
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and their ambiguities. If the economic benefits to ones client outweigh the 
economic costs of a specific course of conduct to ones client, the lawyer 
recommends that course of action. Non-quantifiable factors are not pertinent to 
the analysis.  
Because economic analysis measures costs and benefits relative to time,157
immediate benefits are more valuable than the cost of future lost opportunities. In 
a situation where a party uses his power advantage to impose a penalty, the 
immediate benefit is the amount received from enforcing the penalty. The costs 
include transaction costs and the difficult to quantify cost of the counter-partys ill 
will. Some of the ill will is immediate and some is possibly continuing, so that 
even if one could quantify it, the future ill will would require time value 
adjustment. Ill will includes the loss of future good will and possible future 
patronage. The more remote in time the cost becomes, the less significant it is to 
the economic analysis. Similarly, economic analysis might compare the avoided 
cost of eliminating a defect in an existing product with the future, time adjusted 
cost of compensating an injured user of the product and the loss of patronage to 
the vendor of the product when the injury occurs. Both the compensation and the 
loss of patronage are more remote in time. The avoided cost of eliminating the 
defect is an immediate benefit.158 Such matters as feelings, self-esteem, and long-
term impact on the other party either become quantifiable or lose their place in the 
analysis. 
Undoubtedly, many attorneys might be initially uncomfortable lending their 
skills to impose unfair transactional terms on their clients counter-parties when 
the client holds the dominant position relative to the other party. However, the 
rules of ethics remind them that their first obligation is to the client,159 and 
zealous representation under the ethics rules can motivate them to recommend 
exploitation of power advantages. Other attorneys may feel that a fundamental 
157 Constant time analysis is fundamental to economic analysis. One cannot compare 
amounts received at different times without adjusting them through present or future value 
analysis with an assumed interest rate to a single moment in timegenerally the present time or 
a future time at which all events become complete. The following formula represents the 




Where PV is the present value, FV is the future value, i is the interest rate per compounding 
period, and n is the number of compounding periods. 
158 Cigarette manufacturers and automobile manufacturers have confronted this analysis 
of avoided costs when making decisions with respect to their products. See Derek Yach & 
Stella Aguinaga Bialous, Junking Science to Promote Tobacco, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1745, 
1745 (2001); Evan P. Schultz, Dollars for Bodies, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at 43. 
159 Model Rule 1.2(a) squarely makes the client the primary decision-makerso long as 
the activity is neither criminal nor fraudulent. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) 
(2002). 
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fairness principle ought to drive their practice but fear that application of that 
principle might threaten their livelihood.160 Those attorneys may wonder whether 
it is possible to reconcile their duty to their client with more general principles of 
honesty and fair dealing when the governing rules of ethics preclude such fairness 
considerations. A shift to the multiple client representation model that this Article 
recommends would expand ethical boundaries to accommodate the interests of 
others whom the lawyers counsel affects, in order to promote fairness. 
Both the Coase Theorem161 that stimulated the law and economics 
movement and current behavioral studies162 support those lawyers who would 
choose to dissuade their clients from exploiting the clients power advantages. 
Although Coases theories are foundational to law and economics, Coases 
seminal article163 does not aver that economic analysis can and should determine 
legal rules. Rather, Coase expresses concern that legislators and courts fail to take 
economic displacements into account sufficiently when they alter existing legal 
rules.164
In fact, Coase effectively deconstructs any assumed dependence of the legal 
rule upon economic efficiency. Instead, Coase argues that the parties can achieve 
an economically efficient result so long as the legal rule is stable and predictable 
and transaction costs are minimal.165 The legal rule, once settled, gives one party 
160 Zacharias, supra note 95, at 190 (noting that doing right may threaten the attorneys 
livelihood as a more aggressive attorney may lack such compunction). 
161 See generally Coase, supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., Bower, supra note 26. 
163 See Coase, supra note10. 
164 Id. at 44. 
165 Id. at 8. Coase observes:  
It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage 
caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no 
market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which 
maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing 
system is assumed to work without cost.  
Id. As to transaction costs, Coase notes that they often are significant and preclude the efficient 
market transaction that would make the positioning of the legal rule irrelevant. Id. at 1516. 
Hence, the legal rule does impact economic efficiency when transaction costs come into play. 
Coase argues: 
It would therefore seem desirable that the courts should understand the economic 
consequences of their decisions and should, insofar as this is possible without creating too 
much uncertainty about the legal position itself, take these consequences into account 
when making their decisions. Even when it is possible to change the legal delimitation of 
rights through market transactions, it is obviously desirable to reduce the need for such 
transactions and thus reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out. 
Id. at 19. 
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certain rights that he may sell to the other party whenever it would be 
economically efficient for the other party to buy those rights. At the same time, 
Coase proves that economic analysis has nothing to say about which party should 
have the legal rights to sell. If the other party had the legal rights, he would sell 
them to the first party as long as it was economically efficient for the parties to do 
so. Once the legal right becomes fixed, however, the right takes on a value.  
Property pricing assumes the stability of that right, and parties buy and sell 
their property assuming that fixed legal rights pass with the property. The market 
assimilates the existence of the right in determining the value of the property.166
Therefore, in establishing legal rules, Coase deems it critical that economic 
factors become part of the basic legal analysis.167 He does not argue that 
economic factors are the only ones significant to legal analysis. More important to 
Coase, it seems, is the role that economic analysis plays as a factor to consider 
carefully when courts and legislatures contemplate altering an existing legal 
rule.168 He seems especially concerned that, as one changes rules, economic 
displacements occur. There are winners and losers.169
Throughout his analysis, Coase assumes that the parties have equal 
bargaining power so that the legal rule alone, rather than a power imbalance, 
166 Similarly, the efficient capital market hypothesis assumes that the marketplace rapidly 
assimilates public information and economic conditions and builds them into the price of 
securities. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW 
STUDENTS 38487 (2d ed. 1998). Fair markets require that all participants in the market have 
equal access to material information so that the marketplace can assimilate the information and 
price the securities accordingly. Thus, in order to provide fair markets in securities, Congress 
mandated disclosure of material information as the foundation of the securities laws for the 
efficient functioning of the markets. See LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 1G (2d ed. 
1961). 
167 Coase, supra note 10, at 44.
168 Id.
169 Coase writes: 
But in choosing between social arrangements within the context of which individual 
decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change in the existing system which 
will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. . . . 
In devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total 
effect. 
Id
Pursuing distributional fairness, social justice, and avoidance of harm to others might 
be just as important to legal analysis as weighing economic costs and benefits, although 
those latter factors might be more difficult to address than readily quantifiable costs and 
benefits. 
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determines which party will make a payment to the other.170 Coases law and 
economics would not favor exploitation of power disparities, as such inequality is 
a structural flaw that is economically inefficient.171
Fairness, of course, is not an absolute concept. It tends to be situational. 
Lawyers often think of fairness strictly in procedural terms. So long as each party 
has access to a disinterested forum for resolution of disputes and is not prevented 
from securing competent legal representation, resource disparity is not unfair. 
This Article acknowledges a working, procedural definition of fairness but prefers 
a concept of fairness that demands a balance in outcome that equal bargaining 
power and resources would generate.172
In seeking a distributionally fair result, indicia of unfairness are not always 
transparent. Lack of negotiation may suggest that one party has the power to 
dictate the transactions terms to the other partys detriment. But absence of 
meaningful negotiation in economic transactions may only reflect the 
transactions simplicity and the parties agreement as to value and terms. When 
there is little to negotiate because terms are fair, inequalities in bargaining power 
are trivial. Equality in bargaining power would produce no different result. Such 
cases may be easy for the attorney and she may prepare documentation to 
complete a fair transaction even if the attorneys client dictates the terms. This 
Article does not concern itself with such transactions, of which there are many, 
except to suggest that, so long as the transactional counter-parties do not enjoy 
equal bargaining power, a risk that one party will take advantage of the other is 
ever present.  
Reports on recent behavioral studies using economic, market exchange 
experiments in a variety of cultures suggest that distributional fairnessrather 
than exploitation of power advantagesis the dominant norm among cultures.173
The studies disclose a pattern of fair dealing and sharing both within groups and 
among members of different groups, especially where a market economy is 
familiar to the participants.174 Researchers conducting the studies attribute fair 
dealing in part to conflict avoidance.175 This cutting-edge research contradicts 
170 Id. at 5. In this situation, Coase chooses a legal rule to apply to the cattle-raiser and the 
farmer and allows them to negotiate freely. Coase does not address power to act with impunity 
contrary to the legal rule. Id.
171 Id. at 44. 
172 The Delaware Supreme Court adopted a concept of entire fairness that embraced 
both fair dealing and a fair price for corporate mergers in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701, 71011 (Del. 1983), thereby rejecting the notion that fair procedures alone suffice to 
preclude claims by disgruntled minority shareholders. 
173 See generally Bower, supra note 26. 
174 See id.
175 See id. at 10506 (discussing studies). The Golden Rule may have an ascertainable 
basis in human behavior. In the legal literature, there is a growing movement in law and 
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earlier assumptions that human beings seize whatever advantages they can. 
Bower writes: 
Many evolutionary biologists hold that natural selection has favored individuals 
who are genetically inclined to act out of self-interest in order to propagate their 
own genes.  
Henrich [Joseph Henrich, anthropologist at the Institute for Advanced Study 
in Berlin] theorizes that, throughout humanitys evolution, groups that devised 
the most successful social guidelines for pursuing fair interactions left competing 
groups in the dust. This process advanced genetic traits in the surviving groups 
that proved conducive to hashing out equitable deals.176
Accordingly, the lawyer who recommends courses of action to her clients 
that produce distributional fairness may be serving the client better than those 
who encourage and legitimate exploitation of power advantages. The extended 
multiple client representation model of this Article would enable the lawyer to 
analyze the needs and interests of constituencies other than the immediate client 
and to recommend a distributionally fair course of conduct to the immediate 
client.177
behavioral science that looks closely at the behavioral studies in building law and economics 
models. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000) 
(introducing modified law and economics methodology to include behavioral sciences). The 
authors do not conclude that departure from standard rational choice models is irrational. 
Rather, they suggest that rational choice theories of law and economics are flawed and fail to 
offer a complete behavioral picture. Id. at 114344. Coase may well have understood this 
behavior, but perhaps his law and economics successors did not. See supra text accompanying 
and following note 161. 
176 Bower, supra note 26, at 106. Similarly, in a classic paper reporting on game theory 
experiments, the description of the decisional process in the experimental games includes 
observations that, despite stated game goals of selfishness and competitiveness, the players 
were cooperative. G.K. Kalisch et al., Some Experimental n-Person Games, in NASH, JR., supra
note 27, at 61, 68. Further, the authors (with disappointment) report that in three person 
cooperative games, [t]he results of this experiment were rather negative. The players were 
simply unwilling to play competitively. Id. at 86. 
177 Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of 
Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002). As a proponent of 
behavioral law and economics, Greenfield makes similar arguments in favor of corporate 
constituency statutes. Fairness requires that corporate directors take employees and possibly 
others into account in corporate decision making. Behavioral ultimatum games demonstrate that 
within groups, individuals choose fair distribution of wealth over individual wealth 
maximization. Id. at 63234. 
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VII. DEFINING INTERVENTIONAL FUNCTIONS
Intervention is a matter of the extent to which the client directs the lawyer. As 
the client permits the lawyer increasing autonomy, the lawyer intervenes more to 
define the legal course of action. At least three discrete interventional levels 
characterize American legal practice. The lawyer may move between 
interventional functions in the course of representation on a single matter. The 
following paragraphs describe the levels in ascending degree of the lawyers 
transactional intervention.
A. Scrivener-Lawyers
A lawyer may act in a ministerial manner without becoming engaged in the 
clients decision making. The lawyer drafts required documents according to the 
clients instructions.178 In this instance, the lawyer is a scrivener.179 A scrivener 
who believes that the goals the client wishes her to assist in pursuing are wrong is 
in a difficult position. The client has sought no advice, but may be unaware of 
potential exposure to liability and may welcome the lawyers analysis and 
recommendations. Further, the client simply may have concluded that because 
others use similar structures,180 the client would be at a disadvantage in avoiding 
them. Also, the client may not have considered possible adverse impacts of the 
structures on third parties or how objectionable legal structure might affect the 
178 Needless to say, existing ethical rules generally do not limit the lawyers responsibility 
for actions taken while acting as a scrivener. For example, the lawyer may not assist the client 
in commission of a crime or fraud. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002). As 
scrivener, the lawyer must remain mindful of the conflict of interest rules. MODEL RULES OF 
PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002). On the other hand, if the scrivener truly acts as an intermediary 
between or among clients because she renders no legal advice, the Model Rules offer no 
specific guidance. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 3 (2002). 
179 Frequently, attorneys offer to assume that role when multiple parties with potentially 
disparate interests have the unity of purpose to be co-participants in a common transaction. In 
large law firms, the lawyer, acting as the scrivener, prepares the necessary documentation. See 
supra note 63 and accompanying text. She seeks to isolate herself from other lawyers in the 
firm who continue to represent one of the parties to the transaction on other matters. The 
effectiveness of this Chinese Wall between members of the firm is questionable. The wall 
requires the scrivener to favor neither the interests of the firms historical client nor the interests 
of the non-client parties. In order to do so, the attorney must ignore what she knows from prior 
representation about the interests of the existing client in structuring and drafting documentation 
for the transaction.  
180 See infra Part VII.C. (discussing use of form contracts). 
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clients reputation negatively. Sometimes the lawyers only option may be refusal 
of representation if the clients goals are not acceptable to her.181
B. Architect-Lawyers
Often a client brings to the lawyer the clients transactional and economic 
objectives and leaves design and implementation of the transaction to the lawyer. 
This Article calls this function the architect-lawyer. Here the attorney has the 
opportunity to show the breadth of her creativity. The attorney may have an array 
of techniques and structures: some will impact third parties adversely, others may 
not. If the lawyer withholds recommending a creative, permissible structure that 
affects third parties adversely, the lawyer fails to provide the client with the full 
range of available structures and possibly falls short in diligence.182 Yet if the 
lawyer offers a legal tool that the lawyer knows to be harmful to third parties, the 
lawyer may appear more responsible for that harm than a scrivener who 
implements but makes no recommendation.  
C. Entrepreneur-Lawyers 
Lawyers assume entrepreneurial roles in the interest of generating business. 
Plaintiffs personal injury lawyers regularly advertise with the goal of informing 
potential clients of their possible claims that they may not have pursued. Business 
and tax lawyers seek out planning opportunities that enable their clients to gain 
some economic or legal advantage about which the client otherwise might be 
ignorant. Sometimes, the lawyer as entrepreneur recommends to the client a 
transaction that the lawyer or a third party has introduced, or the client may have a 
nascent transaction concept and the lawyer develops the idea. Lawyers also 
design concepts and market them through others to the client,183 rather than the 
client defining goals. In this case the lawyer may have immediate responsibility 
for collateral effects of the plan equal to or greater than the client to whom the 
lawyer sold the plan. 
181 A lawyer may terminate or decline representation so long as the termination or refusal 
of representation does not materially affect the client adversely. MODEL RULES OF PROFL 
CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002). Preparing documents or structuring the transaction in a manner 
contrary to the clients instructions without informing the client is not an option, as such actions 
would directly violate the attorneys contractual agreement with the client. 
182 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002) (requiring lawyers to 
be diligent in representation). 
183 Investment banking firms have marketed many corporate tax shelters. Tax 
professionals, including tax lawyers, design the shelter techniques and script the 
implementation for investment bankers to sell. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Dynegy's Tax 
Shelter, 95 TAX NOTES 305, 30708 (2002).  
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The motivational vector from the attorneys recommendation to the clients 
acceptance of the plan is identifiable and direct. In the case of scriveners, the 
motivational vector seems to be the reverserunning from the client to the 
lawyer. For architect lawyers, direction of the motivation is less obviousthe 
attorney designs the plan to suit the clients objectives. Nevertheless, the 
examples in the next part of this Article demonstrate that the motivational 
direction with all three types of legal invention often is the samethe attorney 
motivates the client. 
VIII. INTERVENTIONAL ROLES AND OTHER CONSTITUENCIES: 
SOME EXAMPLES
In Part III, this Article described the common business practice of single 
lawyer representation of multiple parties to a transaction. The lawyer knows that 
she must balance the interests of the parties in order to complete the assignment 
successfully. In other instances, multiple party representation is inherent in the 
nature of the engagement. For example, lawyers who represent organizations 
routinely engage in multiple party representation.184 The organization acts 
through its duly authorized constituents185 who may not have 
identical interests.186 Constituents include officers, directors, employees, 
shareholders and other constituents.187 Other constituents might mean the 
communities at large in which the organizations headquarters or operations 
are located,188 in the case of a publicly traded organization,189 the 
184 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.13(e) (2002). 
185 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2002). 
186 See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.13(d), (e) (2002) (requiring the lawyer to 
explain the identity of the client when the organizations interests are adverse to the 
constituents interests and permitting the lawyer to represent the organization and one or more 
constituents). 
187 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmts. 15 (2002) (The Entity as the 
Client). 
188 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (citing 
Martin Lipton & Andrew R. Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors Responsibilities: 
An Update, ABA NATL INST. ON THE DYNAMICS OF CORP. CONTROL, Dec. 8, 1983, reprinted 
in 40 BUS. LAW. 1403 (1985)). Unocal makes other constituencies, including creditors, 
employees, vendors, etc., part of the mix of affected parties that corporate directors may 
consider in evaluating whether or not to defend against a takeover attempt. If the board of 
directors may consider the other constituencies, the lawyer for the organization would have to 
consider those constituencies as well. But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (limiting consideration of other constituencies once an 
auction for control of the corporation commences).  
189 Some thirty states have enacted specific constituency statutes that permit or require 
corporate boards to consider the interests of various third parties in corporate decision making. 
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investing public190 and, in the case of a charitable organization, the underlying 
charitable beneficiaries.191 Similarly, whether or not one considers privity to bar 
the beneficiary from making claims against the estate planning lawyer,192 estate 
planning by definition involves interests of more than one party: the property 
owner who is deciding how to transmit wealth and the ultimate recipients of that 
wealth.193 Further, lawyers prepare many form contracts, especially consumer 
contracts, knowing that the counter-party to the direct client whom the contract 
also will bind has neither separate representation nor the bargaining power to 
influence the provisions of the contract, even if he had separate representation.194
The direct client, or in the case of an entity client, management of the entity, 
in each of the above examples uses the lawyers skills in a manner that affects the 
other constituencies. The other constituencies often have insufficient bargaining 
power to alter that effect.195 The attorney should apply a multiple party 
In evaluating a prospective takeover, Oregons statute, for example, permits corporate directors 
to give due consideration to the social, legal and economic effects on employees, 
customers . . . and on the communities . . . in which the corporation operate[s] . . . including the 
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the 
corporation . . . . OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1999). New Yorks statute is similar, 6 N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. § 717(b) (2001). See generally Greenfield, supra note 177 (discussing constituency 
statutes in the context of behavioral law and economics and arguing that broadening corporate 
directors fiduciary duties to include employees and others might increase economic efficiency 
overall even though shareholders wealth might decline); see also Jonathan D. Springer, 
Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 
(1999) (comparing various constituency statutes). 
190 See Lorne, supra note 118; Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of 
Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507 (1994). 
191 Creighton Univ. v. Kleinfeld, 919 F. Supp. 1421 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (allowing Creighton 
to bring an action against drafting attorney for making it, as residuary beneficiary, solely 
responsible for taxes on QTIP trust); see also Jewish Hosp. v. Boatmen's Natl Bank of 
Belleville, 633 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that because the beneficiaries of 
charitable trusts, unlike beneficiaries of private trusts, are ordinarily indefinite, the states 
attorney general has primary responsibility for the supervision of charitable trusts and is 
generally the proper party to enforce them); see, e.g., Hardman v. Feinstein, 240 Cal. Rptr. 483 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987). Standing for beneficiaries was found nonetheless in Jones v. Grant, 344 
So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977) (students of university sue trustees for breach of fiduciary duties 
in administering trust), but the Alabama Nonprofit Corporation Act, ALA. CODE §§ 10-3A-1 to 
3A-225, superceded that right in 1984. 
192 Compare Fogel, supra note 98 (no obligation to beneficiaries), with Hazard, supra
note 58 (obligation to beneficiaries). 
193 Ordower, supra note 98, at 33233. 
194 Vukowich, supra note 44, at 800, 811. 
195 Trade unions and organized consumer groups may be able to consolidate power to 
combat overreaching, but in many cases the employer or the vendor under a one-sided contract 
may act before the group can assemble information concerning the transaction structure that 
overreaches. Cf. supra note 145 and accompanying text; see generally MICHAEL D. YATES, 
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representation model whenever she anticipates that the nature of the 
representation will affect persons other than her direct client and those others 
who, for whatever reason, cannot negotiate to moderate her direct clients 
decisions.196 The next section offers an example of each interventional level and 
explores whether the responsibility that accompanies a multiple party 
representation model should be universal or should vary as a function of the 
lawyers role.  
A. Cash Balance Conversions and the Lawyer as Entrepreneur
The lawyer approaches the client and informs the client (or prospective 
client) that the client has need for specific legal services of which the client may 
have been unaware. The lawyer recommends a legal structure or transaction 
without the client first engaging the lawyer to advise on the matter. While the 
lawyers mode of reaching prospective clients differs from that of the much-
maligned ambulance chaser,197 it involves marketing ones services as personal 
injury practice often does. The lawyer meets clients through referrals or pursues 
previous representation contacts (including cross-selling of services to clients of a 
firm) and seeks to persuade the clients that the lawyer can provide a legal product 
that has economic value for the client. 198
One such product is the cash balance pension plan.199 Employers that convert 
their existing defined benefit retirement plans200 into cash balance plans are able 
WHY UNIONS MATTER (1998); FELIX G. RIVERA & JOHN L. ERLICH, COMMUNITY ORGANIZING 
IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (2d ed. 1995).  
196 See supra Part IV (discussing proposed standard). 
197 [A]mbulance chaser. 1. A lawyer who approaches victims of accidents in hopes of 
persuading them to sue for damages. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 80 (7th ed. 1999). 
198 One lawyer I interviewed who actively engages in a pension plan practice cautions that 
lawyers do little of the marketing of pension plans and modifications of existing plans. 
Consultants develop the products and prepare slick presentations for the clients. Lawyers cannot 
hold a candle to pension consultants when it comes to marketing plan changes and new 
structures to plan users. His view was that the lawyers serve more the scrivener role than the 
entrepreneur role. The consultants sell the product to the clients and the clients have the lawyers 
prepare the documents and do the compliance work. 
199 Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683 (2000), 
explains the conversion, the reasons for converting, and the benefits to the employer. The 
controversy involves only conversions and not independent establishment of cash balance 
plans. A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan under which the employees pension benefit 
is a function of the balance in his or her account at the time of retirement and, thus, resembles a 
defined contribution plan. The cash balance builds at a substantially constant rate throughout 
the term of employment.  
200 Pension plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), codified in part in 26 U.S.C. §§ 40109 (2001) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 
(2001), are either defined benefit or defined contribution plans. Employers or employees, or 
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to utilize the excess plan value,201 without incurring tax-based penalties, 202 to 
fund benefits that would be attractive to young, possibly mobile203 employees. 
Conversions tend to limit older employees continuing benefit accruals.204 The 
both employers and employees, contribute to defined contribution plans that establish accounts 
for the employees. The contributions and earnings on the account of an employee provide the 
fund from which the employee draws upon retirement. Accordingly, the contribution is defined 
but the benefit is unknown until retirement. In the case of a defined benefit plan, the employer 
establishes a plan to provide a specific benefit to retiring employees based upon their 
compensation, age, and length of service. Actuarial computations enable the employer to 
determine how much to contribute to the plan each year to fund the benefit for all current 
employees. The plan defines the benefit but not the contribution, since the contribution is a 
function of the composition of the work force (including age, length of service, etc.), rates of 
return on invested capital in the plan, and life expectancy of employees. 
201 Rapid investment appreciation during the 1990s produced the excess. The 
accumulations are excess because under the plans actuarial assumptions, the plan will not need 
the accumulations to fund employees retirement benefits. Actuarial assumptions evaluate 
factors including age and length of service of employees in determining how much the plan 
must have in order to fund the retirement benefits. Under a traditional plan, benefit accrual rates 
increase steeply as employees age and approach retirement. So, adding younger employees to 
the work force does not materially increase the amount of plan assets the plan requires and does 
not consume the excess assets that successful investment generates. Zelinsky, supra note 196, at 
70913.  
202 I.R.C. § 4980 (2001). The employer cannot use the excess accumulation to provide 
portable benefits to younger employees under a defined contribution plan because the tax rules 
do not permit free movement of assets from defined benefit to defined contribution plans. Use 
of the funds from the defined benefit plan would be a reversion subject to the reversion 
penalties under I.R.C. § 4980. Since the cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan, conversion 
of the traditional plan into a cash balance plan occurs without penalty. Conversion permits the 
employer to fund the increased and possibly portable benefits for the younger employees with 
the accumulated excess in the traditional plan. The employer does not have to contribute to 
another plan for those employees. In most conversion instances, the conversion benefit provides 
a windfall to the employer who did not anticipate the windfall as part of his business plan. The 
potential windfall provides the entrepreneurial lawyer with a valuable marketing tool.  
203 Unlike traditional defined benefit plans, cash balance plan accounts are often portable. 
Portability means that the employee has a vested account in the plan. When the employee 
leaves before retirement, the employee keeps the account balance rather than losing benefits 
under a traditional plan. Accordingly, pension benefits cease to depend on a lifelong 
commitment to a single employer. 
204 While conversion does not reduce older employees accrued benefits, it does diminish 
the rate of future accrual. In addition, a wear-away feature typically limits additions to older 
employees cash balance plan accounts. If the older employees accrued benefit at the time of 
conversion exceeds the amount that the employee would have accrued under the cash balance 
plan, as is likely to be the case, the plan would fund the older employees future benefit by 
wearing away that excess rather than by increasing the employees separate account balance. 
See Zelinsky, supra note 199, at 74348. 
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adverse impact of the conversions on older employees has attracted media 
attention,205litigation,206 and controversy.207
While some commentators view the benefit formula of new rather than 
converted cash balance plans as being neutral with respect to age,208 conversion 
of traditional plans into cash benefit plans shifts future accrual benefits from older 
to younger employees.209 Accordingly, conversion discriminates against the most 
expensive employees under traditional defined benefit plans.210 As conversion 
impacts older employees adversely, it benefits employers. Conversion provides 
205 See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Clinton Seeks Disclosure Rules on Changes to 
Pension Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1999, at C11. In light of the Enron Corporations recent 
bankruptcy filing, the media are likely to focus attention on so-called 401k plans, named after 
the enabling provision I.R.C. § 401(k) (2001), that invest in the employers securities.  
206 Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2000), holds that the plan must 
use interest rates under I.R.C. § 417(e)(3)(A) (2001) to determine lump sum distributions of 
accrued benefits under cash balance plans. Similarly, I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359 
mandates use of government supplied interest rates for computing lump sum plan distributions. 
Recently, in Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,596 
(S.D. Ill. 2003), on cross-motions for summary judgment in a class action suit, the court 
held the IBM benefit accrual formula under its cash balance plan to be age discriminatory 
in violation of ERISA. And in Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guar. Plan, 338 F.3d 
755 (7th Cir. 2003), also a class action, employees who participated in the cash balance 
plan and took a lump sum distribution on termination of employment successfully 
challenged the manner in which the plan computed the benefit. The court held the 
formula to violate non-discrimination rules in ERISA. 
207 The government proposed to limit the impact of the conversions through increased 
disclosure obligations in order to eliminate informational power disparities between the 
employer and the employee. See, e.g., Pension Reduction Disclosure Act of 1999, S. 1708, 
106th Cong. (1999) (proposing to amend ERISA § 204(h) to mandate increased data 
disclosure).  
208 The neutrality observation is itself controversial. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 196, at 
734. 
209 Controversy surrounding cash balance conversions led the Internal Revenue Service to 
require that plan sponsors request technical advice before conversion, Rev. Proc. 2001-5, 2001-
1 C.B. 164, 170, in order to enforce a Clinton administration moratorium on conversions. I.R.S. 
Announcement 2003-1, 2003-2 I.R.B. 1, announced that responses to technical advice would 
follow final regulations on age discrimination. The Department of the Treasury promulgated 
proposed regulations that permit, without age discrimination limitations, the reduction of 
accruals based upon years in service, as opposed to age, even though age and years in service 
correlate. See I.R.C. § 411(b), Reductions of Accruals and Allocations because of Attainment of 
Any Age, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,123 (Dec. 11, 2002); see also, Lee A. Sheppard, A Square Peg in a 
Round Hole: Cash Balance Plans Ratified, 97 TAX NOTES 1386 (2002) (providing a brief 
critique of the proposed regulations). 
210 Sheppard, supra note 206. This may not be discrimination in participation and benefits 
that ERISA prohibits. But see Richard C. Shea, et al., Age Discrimination in Cash Balance 
Plans: Another View, 19 VA. TAX REV. 763 (2000); Kevin P. OBrien & Rosina B. Barker, 
Letter re Cash Balance Wear-Away, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 249-13 (2001). 
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employers the opportunity to offer portability in a cash balance plan which 
facilitates the employers ability to attract young, enthusiastic, mobile employees 
who might not view a specific job as life-long. Retirement benefits that those 
employees do not lose when they change employment are an appealing feature of 
a compensation package. Further conversion enables the employer to capture for 
itself some of the historical investment success of its existing defined benefit plan 
and use it to fund those portable benefits.211
Thus, the conversion product would benefit the entrepreneurial lawyers 
direct client, the employer, and would harm others. Those others, the older 
employees, could do little to prevent the harm from conversion even if they had 
separate representation because selection of plans and conversion is wholly within 
the employers control (without participation of the employees the conversion 
affects). Informational power disparity may accompany the direct power disparity 
of the employer-employee relationship. Moreover, direct power disparity between 
the employer and the employee tends to increase as the employee ages and 
becomes less mobile and marketable.212
For the lawyer, traditional definitions of the client identify only the employer 
as the client. The single client representation model and the culture of zeal lead to 
the conclusion that the lawyer should develop and recommend the conversion 
structure to the employer. The structure benefits the employer, who the lawyer 
represents (or hopes to represent) zealously. The single client model does not 
mandate that the lawyer explore options that might provide a smaller benefit to 
the employer but be less harmful to others.  
As primary motivator, the lawyer must bear a large share of the responsibility 
for the plans adverse effects on employees. Sensitivity to the older employees 
might lead to the establishment of a parallel or integrated cash balance plan. All 
employees could elect plans. Older employees would be likely to elect the 
traditional plan while younger employees would prefer the cash balance plan.213
By giving older employees this option, the employer achieves the goal of 
portability for younger employees but loses some or all of the opportunity to 
capture for itself the benefit of a historically successful investment performance of 
211 See Zelinsky, supra note 198, at 70913.  
212 Employment options for older individuals diminish because older employees have 
become expensive and often specialized. With their relatively short-term employment futures, 
older employees are less desirable to prospective employers than younger individuals. 
Employers often are unwilling to invest in retraining for new jobs. See e.g., 
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE AGING, 2001 PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA, at 
http://www.ncoa.org/content.cfm?sectionID=168&detail=74#workers (last visited Nov. 12, 
2003). However, the New York Times reports improvements in the job market for older 
individuals as older workers make up a larger percentage of the work force 
(approximately 12%) than they did in 2000. Louis Uchitelle, Older Workers Are Thriving 
Despite Recent Hard Times, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at A1. 
213 Zelinsky, supra note 198, at 697. 
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the plans assets.214 The trade-off for reducing the windfall to the employer would 
be fairer treatment of the older employees.215
B. Estate Planning and the Architect Lawyer
Most clients come to their estate planners with a basic idea of how they desire 
to distribute their wealth when they die. The clients expect the lawyers to design 
estate plans to carry out those wishes in a tax-efficient manner. The degree of 
intervention by the lawyer is less than it is in the case of the lawyer-entrepreneur 
because the client comes to the lawyer, not the lawyer to the client. But the degree 
of intervention in the case of estate planning does not necessarily make the lawyer 
less responsible for the impact of the representation on other constituencies. 
Estate planning clients are particularly vulnerable to the influence from their 
estate planning lawyers.216
The lawyers remain keenly aware of their competition both from other 
lawyers and from non-lawyer participants in estate planning and tend to respond 
to the competition by offering each client the full range of standardized planning 
products. Frequently, lawyers do not understand the underlying family dynamics. 
Instead, lawyers offer plans that employ a variety of clever techniquesqualified 
terminable interest property trusts (Qtips)217 and dynastic trusts,218 for example
214 It is unclear whether or not partial conversion is possible to permit the employer to use 
part of the excess from the traditional plan to fund the cash balance plan. If it is, the amount of 
available excess would be less than that available under complete conversion because the costs 
of funding the older employees with the continuing traditional plan would be higher. 
215 But see John M. Vine & Richard C. Shea, Re: The Anti-Backloading Rules, 2001 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 110, 11023 (2001) (featuring a letter to William Sweetnam, Esq. that expresses 
the concern that the IRS application of anti-backloading rules would preclude such protection of 
older employees). Legislative or regulatory intervention might be necessary to facilitate the 
bifurcated plan but the plan would not be contrary to the public policy that ERISA advances. 
216 See, e.g., Ordower, supra note 98, at 31415. 
217 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1992) permits passage of property to a surviving spouse in a 
manner that qualifies the testamentary gift for the unlimited, estate tax marital deduction but 
denies the survivor control over investment of the property, access to the corpus, and power to 
designate the recipients following the survivors death. For arguments against the propriety of 
the qualified terminable interest property trust because it disempowers and degrades women, 
see Ordower, supra note 98 at 34344; Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction Qtip 
Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMENS L.J. 301 (1995). 
218 Historically, the rule against perpetuities prevented the transfer of property in trust if 
the trust would continue for a period longer than lives in being plus twenty-one years. Recently 
several states, North Dakota and New Jersey among them, have enacted legislation that 
eliminates the rule against perpetuities and permits establishment of trusts that will continue for 
many generations. While the trusts enjoy tax-favored status because their assets become subject 
to the estate or gift tax and the generation-skipping tax only once, they often delegate to a 
trustee who is not the beneficiary considerable control over the wealth and its disposition. 
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to pass wealth while seeming to keep control of the wealth for the donor. 
However, the donor does not retain control because the donor will be dead when 
the trusts become operative. Instead, control goes to the deputy for the 
client/donor and the intended recipients of the clients estate are somewhat 
disempowered. 
In many instances, some or all of the beneficiaries of the trusts are also clients 
of the same lawyer. Estate planners routinely prepare estate plans for the family 
unit consisting of husband, wife, and sometimes children.219 The owner of the 
bulk of the familys wealth may be one spouse, perhaps the husband. The estate 
planning lawyer discusses the estate plan with the husband, as the lawyer prepares 
wills and trusts for husband and wife. The lawyer mentions or recommends to the 
husband the Qtip trust and describes it as a common and popular estate planning 
mechanism. It helps to preserve the family wealth for the children in the event the 
wife remarries. It also allows the client to designate someone other than the wife 
as trustee, so the wife need not concern herself with management of the family 
wealth.  
The Qtip disempowers the wife with respect to ultimate control over the 
familys wealth.220 The husband may have had no intention of disempowering his 
wife. And even if it did occur to the husband, it may be a wrong-headed and 
offensive notion.221 Nevertheless, because this is standard practice and the 
attorneys recommendation legitimizes the Qtip device, rendering it appropriate 
and helpful, the husband follows the attorneys advice. A sense of balance may 
lead the lawyer to recommend that the wife create a similar trust for her husband. 
Since she controls little of the family units wealth, parallel financial 
disempowerment and balance is illusory.  
The estate plan for the marital unit seems contrary to the best interests of the 
wife, and possibly the family as a whole, as it denies the wife decision making 
power with respect to the children as they mature. Under existing rules, if the 
lawyer recognizes that the plan she has devised may be objectionable to the wife, 
she must not represent the wife unless the wife gives her informed consent to 
the representation. In order for consent to be informed, however, the lawyer 
would have to provide full disclosure of the objectionable elements of the
proposed plan and explain why they are objectionable.222 Since the wife is 
unrepresented, the lawyer may recommend only that the wife secure separate 
219 Cf. Pennell, supra note 76 (describing trend towards estate planning for family units as 
opposed to individuals). 
220 The Qtip is just an example. As much as the estate planning industry depends upon 
various trust configurations, many trusts disempower their beneficiaries without compelling 
reasons for so doing. See Ordower, supra note 98 at 328. 
221 See, e.g., Gerzog, supra note 217.  
222 See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2002). 
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counsel.223 Unfortunately, separate counsel for the wife will not cure the defect. 
Except for the power of persuasion that separate counsel might bring to bear, 
separate counsel is substantially powerless. The wifes lawyer has power only 
derivatively through the wife. Since the wife controls the smaller portion of 
family wealth, she has little economic bargaining power. Even though state law 
offers the wife a forced share of the husbands estate, that share is woefully 
inadequate. While state legislatures designed the forced share to substitute for the 
wifes dower rights under common law and to prevent husbands from 
disinheriting their wives, both dower and forced share statutes are extremely 
limited in scope.224 Most often, electing the forced share would leave the wife in 
a financially less secure position than would result from accepting the Qtip and its 
control limitations.225 Further, even the separate counsels power of persuasion is 
exercisable only through the wife. Ethical rules generally bar separate counsel 
from contacting the husband directly.226 Divorce might approach equalization of 
the spouses wealth but is hardly a tactic one might recommend in an otherwise 
successful marriage. 
The estate planning lawyer might avoid the conflict if she enters the 
representational relationship with a clear understanding of all affected parties. The 
husband would understand that the lawyer represents multiple parties, including 
the wife, children, and possible collateral relatives and charities as well. The 
lawyer, then, would be sensitive to the interests and needs of all parties and would 
be able to maintain limited confidences and to negotiate an overall plan that 
accommodates the principal objectives of all. Planning in this manner demands a 
223 See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.3 & cmts. 12 (2002). 
224 The limited scope is similar to the unconscionability concept in the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which prevents only the most egregious overreaching in consumer 
contracts. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002); discussion infra Part VIII.C (discussing related issues 
with form consumer contracts). 
225 By electing the forced share, the wife relinquishes other interests in the husbands 
estate. Generally, the forced share is one-third of the husbands estate, excluding proceeds of 
life insurance that are not payable to the husbands estate. Economically, the present value of 
the income interest in the bulk of the husbands estate often is significantly greater than the 
amount of the forced share. For example, Missouri gives the surviving spouse the power to take 
one-half the deceased spouses estate if there are no lineal descendants and one-third if there are 
lineal descendants. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.160 (1957). The decedents estate is enhanced by 
lifetime transfers and life insurance payable to the surviving spouse but not by transfers or 
insurance payable to third parties, and the elective share decreases by the value of lifetime 
transfers and life insurance payable to the surviving spouse. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.163 
(1981). Under the 1969 UPC, the spouse was entitled to a one-third share. Under the current 
version, however, the share percentage depends on the length of the marriage (from 
supplemental amount only for a newlywed couple, up to 50% for a fifteen-plus year 
marriage) and the valuation is based on the "augmented estate" which includes nonprobate 
transfers to others. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1990). 
226 See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). 
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high level of engagement and a willingness to reject the easy to use, estate-
planning molds. The lawyer might have to refrain from recommending some 
techniques thatlike the Qtiptend to disempower individuals in favor of a 
more inclusive approach to estate planning. Undoubtedly, there will be situations 
in which such multiple party representation would be impossible. Ethical rules 
should not bar multiple party representation generally, as it frequently is the most 
efficient manner in which to address family needs and is likely to prove less 
costly and breed less ill will. The family becomes representative of the situation in 
the multiple party representation model that Part II of this Article describes. 
C. Form Consumer Contracts and the Scrivener Lawyer
Most businesses that provide goods or services for future delivery rely on 
form contracts to define their relationship with their customers.227 Business 
owners and managers understand that many, possibly most, of their customers 
will sign the form contract without reading, much less comprehending, the terms 
of the contracts.228 The longer and more detailed the contract is, the less likely 
customers are to read the contract, especially if the transaction is routine229 or 
time is critical.230 While educated consumers are more likely to read the contract 
than uneducated consumers, both are likely to forego the reading because both 
realize that the contractual terms are non-negotiable.231 The customer either signs 
the form contract or the transaction will not take place. Whether or not onerous 
provisions of the contract are enforceable is of little consequence. 
A colleague described her recent encounter with an unenforceable contract. 
The operator of a facility that provides childrens birthday parties requires each 
parent to sign a waiver of liability form upon arrival before the child may enter 
the facility. The form exculpates the facility and its employees from any 
responsibility for injury to any child attending a birthday party. The circumstances 
are coercive. A parent who does not wish to sign the waiver must leave with the 
child after the child has seen all her classmates or friends entering the facility. 
227 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of AdhesionSome Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 63132 (1943); Vukowich, supra note 44, at 802. 
228 See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the CodeThe Emperors New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 504 (1967). 
229 The purchase of ordinary consumer goods, for example. 
230 Renting a car is an example where the customer is often short of time, and an impatient 
line of other customers is waiting for service. The person presenting the contract for signature 
generally has no power to vary the contractual terms on behalf of the vendor. The clerk at a 
rental car counter has the power only to permit the customer to accept or waive additional 
insurance coverages but has no authority with respect to the printed contract terms. 
231 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 44849 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 
(viewing absence of choice and unreasonable contract terms as unconscionability); see 
alsoVukowich supra note 44, at 800.  
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Imagine the parents dilemma! There can be little reason for the waiver other than 
to give the facility operator leverage to use against those parents of injured 
children who are not aware that the provision is unenforceable.232
Sometimes legislation regulates the contract by providing the consumer with 
a cancellation option for a limited period.233 Legislation or judicial decisions may 
limit enforceability of onerous contractual provisions as well. Forfeiture 
penalties234 and confession of judgment clauses235 often are unenforceable. 
Nevertheless, the contracts tend to remain one-sided and frequently include 
provisions that are not enforceable or are of doubtful enforceability.236
Lawyers prepare the forms. Some of those lawyers are architect lawyers237
who design the contract for a specific type of client. The architects anticipate all 
imaginable eventualities and resolve them in favor of the client.238 Often, 
however, attorneys prepare one-sided form contracts in response to clients 
specific instructions. Clients in those instances are not seeking legal advice but 
following what they perceive or what the lawyers think their clients perceive to be 
the industry norm. Frequently, the client will have seen a competitors contract or 
a contract used in a related industry and will instruct the lawyer to prepare a 
similar form for the clients consumer transactions. Whether as architects or 
scriveners, the lawyers know that some provisions in the contract are not 
232 See, e.g., Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal. App. Dept Super. 
Ct. 1993) (holding that a contractual disclaimer in a written agreement did not insulate 
defendant lessor of ski boots from strict products liability in tort). However, courts have held 
that exculpatory agreements, within the context of recreational activities, are not adhesion 
contracts. See, e.g., Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: 
Exculpatory Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 7 (1997). 
Then again, contracts parents sign for minors are subject to disaffirmation and additional 
validation scrutiny. See, e.g., Del Bosco v. United States Ski Assn, 839 F. Supp. 1470 (D. 
Colo. 1993) (finding that nothing in the agreement indicated that by signing the agreement the 
skiers mother agreed to waive the skiers claims). Even experienced lawyers, however, may 
doubt whether the waiver is unenforceable and are dissuaded from bringing an action for a 
compensable, but non-permanent, injury to their child. 
233 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1995) (providing a rescission right with respect to 
consumer credit transactions); Rule Concerning a Cooling-Off Period, 16 C.F.R. § 429 (2001) 
(outlining the FTCs door-to-door sales rule). 
234 See Vukowich, supra note 44, at 822. 
235 See id. 
236 Proposed Model Rule 4.3 would have prohibited the lawyer from drafting an 
agreement that is illegal, contains legally prohibited terms, would work a fraud, or would be 
held to be unconscionable as a matter of law. Vukowich, supra note 45 at 833.  
237 Cf. supra Part VII.B. 
238 Karl Llewellyn observed that lawyers draft to the edge of the possible. N.Y. LAW 
REVISION COMMN, supra note 8. 
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enforceable,239 others are of doubtful enforceability,240 and still others are 
enforceable but exploitive of the clients superior bargaining position relative to 
the customer. One commentator argues that legislative change and decisional law 
have tended to correct the imbalance in the standard form contract system, but 
that the process of correction has been inefficient and slow.241
Federal law, for example, renders disclaimers of the warranty of 
merchantability unenforceable.242 Similarly, the warranty of habitability in a 
residential lease is not subject to waiver whether by express contract or 
otherwise.243 Nevertheless, broad disclaimers of warranty still accompany the 
sale of many consumer goods and severe habitability warranty limitations persist 
in some rental contracts. With respect to unenforceable provisions, their inclusion 
in the contract is solely strategic. Their presence in the contract benefits the client 
not through application but because they will deter some customers from acting 
contrary to the express, but unenforceable, contractual language. What reason 
could there be for including the language other than to take advantage of the other 
partys informational deficit? Informed parties would know the provision to be 
unenforceable and would proceed as if the unenforceable provision did not exist. 
The uninformed, on the other hand, may forego an opportunity or a remedy 
otherwise available because of the unenforceable language. Lawyers who draft 
the language aid their clients in exploiting their informational power 
superiority.244
While the proposed rule the ABA rejected governing illegal contract 
language245 would not have barred many imbalanced provisions of form 
239 See Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. On Profl Ethics, Op. 722 
(1948) (determining that it is unethical to include an unlawful tenant waiver of a sixty-day 
period in which to cancel a rent increase).  
240 See Vukowich, supra note 44, at 823.  
241 Id. at 824 (proposing greater policing of the forms by the legal profession that creates 
them). 
242 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 23012312 (2001). 
243 See Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 13031 (W. Va. 1978) ([S]ince [i]t is fair to 
presume that no individual would voluntarily choose to live in a dwelling that had become 
unsafe for human habitation, we hold that waivers of the implied warranty of habitability are 
against public policy. (footnote omitted)); Boston Hous. Auth. v Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 
836 (Mass. 1985). 
244 The waiver may not be utterly without function other than to deceive. The express 
contractual waiver, under the Parol Evidence Rule, may serve the function of precluding the 
other party from introducing oral warranties because the contract addresses warranties in 
writing. Parol-evidence rule. The principle that a writing intended by the parties to be a final 
embodiment of their agreement cannot be modified by evidence that adds to, varies, or 
contradicts the writing. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1139 (7th ed. 1999). 
245 MODEL RULES OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY R. 4.3 (Proposed Official Draft 2002). See
Vukowich, supra note 44. 
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contracts, the rule at least would have compelled practitioners to reflect upon the 
language they drafted and the impact that language has on the contracting parties. 
Without the rule, the Model Rules do not prohibit inclusions of unenforceable 
provisions,246 but neither do the Rules promote those inclusions as part of the 
lawyers obligations to the client. If the client specifically requests the inclusion, 
the lawyer presumably should include the provisions because the client defines 
the scope and goals of the representation so long as the lawyer does not assist the 
client in perpetrating a fraud or a criminal act.247 The Rules silence as to 
unenforceable provisions is neutral on the issue and each lawyer must decide 
whether including unenforceable provisions serves a permissible objective for the 
client.248
Language of doubtful enforceability and other one-sided provisions appear in 
the contract because the other party lacks the bargaining power to resist their 
inclusion. Under current rules emerging from the culture of zeal, the lawyers 
obligation well may be to include such provisions to assist the client in 
maximizing his economic position. At the same time, the attorney preparing the 
language confirms for or signals to the client that the language is customary, 
appropriate, and part of an industry norm representative of the industrys 
participants. Thus, unbalanced contracts can become the norm in the industry as 
soon as one lawyer prepares one for one client. Without evaluating the impact of 
the contractual language on the customers, each industry participant implicitly 
may have relied upon counsel to provide a contract that was suitable to the type of 
transaction in which the client customarily engaged. Many industry participants 
themselves may not comprehend the function of the offensive contractual 
language. Frequently, when one questions specific language, the industry 
participant responds that the language is just what the lawyers provided and that 
he, the industry participant, does not ever seek to enforce the provision.249
In fact the normalization of one-sided contracting may saddle an industry 
with a reputation for dishonesty and unfair dealing. Customers may approach the 
industry with distrust.250 While occasionally clients may benefit from one-sided 
contractual terms, clients also may lose business to other industries that provide a 
marginally substitutable product when the competing industry enjoys a consumer 
246 See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2002). 
247 See id.
248 If the lawyer finds the purpose of language unacceptable, the lawyer may withdraw 
from representation. MODEL RULE OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2002). 
249 Evidence of this practice is anecdotal but it does seem commonplace. Cf. N.Y. LAW 
REVISION COMMN, supra note 8, at 113 (reporting Karl Llewellyns observation that clients 
frequently do not want drafting to the edge of the possible at all); see also Vukowich, supra
note 44, at 803 n.20. 
250 Vukowich, supra note 44, at 81011 (observing that consumers discount the 
significance of terms because they assume that they are the industry norm). 
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reputation for honesty and fair dealing. Even scrivener lawyers should help their 
clients evaluate whether what the clients perceive to be the industry norm is 
useful or desirable for the client. A lawyer who, adopting a multiple party 
representation model, sees the unrepresented consumer as a constituency upon 
which the lawyers activities have a significant impact, will evaluate the overall 
impact of the type of contract the client will use more carefully than the single 
client lawyer.251 A scrivener should explain to the immediate client, whether or 
not asked, the ramifications of the contract, limitations on enforceability, and 
possible effect of the contracts language on the clients reputation. The benefit of 
the imbalanced language measured against the effect on the clients reputation 
and harm to other affected constituencies may suffice to dissuade the client from 
following the industry norm and, by abandoning the norm, the client may effect a 
shift in the norm to balanced contracting.  
IX. CONCLUSION: THE MULTIPLE PARTY REPRESENTATION MODEL
Both the Model Code and Model Rules provide helpful bright line rules of 
conduct for client representation in genuine adversarial contexts, that is, 
preparation for or conduct of litigation. Drafters of the Model Rules, however, 
expressed considerable discomfort with the culture of zeal generally. As noted 
earlier,252 commentary accompanying the Model Rules, but not the Rules 
themselves, suggests that zealous advocacy is inappropriate when the opposing 
party is poorly represented, not represented, or lacks sufficient power to alter the 
outcome even if well-represented. The Model Rules do not integrate the 
limitation on zealous advocacy into any rule and thus fail to develop the standard 
of legal conduct for instances in which zealous advocacy may be inappropriate.  
Bright line rules facilitate compliance. But bright line rules of conduct 
emanating from the single client, zealous advocacy model of legal practice have 
led to a level of ruthlessness in law practice that has sullied the reputation of the 
legal profession.253 In many instances, the legal profession has propelled its 
251 Compare this with the proposal to shift responsibility to lawyers for the standard form 
contract system. See id. at 82641. 
252 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. (2002); see also supra note 94 and 
accompanying text. 
253 See the rather bleak picture of the legal profession that emerges from JOSEPH, supra
note 16. Lawyers ratings in recent public confidence surveys confirm the public view of 
lawyers. See Symposium, American Bar Association Report on Perceptions of the U.S. Justice 
System, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1307, 1320 (1999) ([O]nly 14% of respondents said they are 
extremely or very confident in lawyers. In fact, the only category generating less confidence 
than the U.S. Congress and lawyers is the media at 8%. . . . Further, almost half of all 
respondents (42%) lack confidence in lawyers.). For a summary of the extensive 1993 Hart 
Survey on public opinions of lawyers, see Daicoff, supra note 15, at 552. See also Marc 
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clients to focus only on immediate benefit to themselves in their legal dealings. 
But single client advocacy models ignore the realities of ordinary legal practice. 
Lawyers do not operate in a vacuum in which only lawyer and client are 
important. Ethical rules that require or encourage the lawyer to pretend that the 
vacuum exists disserve the legal community.  
In litigation contexts, increasing reliance on negotiation and mediation rather 
than litigation suggests broad-based discomfort with the culture of zeal as the pre-
eminent basis for all legal representation and settlement of disputes. Rather than 
motivating clients to exploit power disparities, lawyers can encourage their clients 
to moderate or even abandon that tendency. Ethical rules that acknowledge the 
impact of legal representation on people other than the direct client better serve 
the legal community. In making the transition away from exploitation of power 
advantages, such ethical rules would enable lawyers to take other constituencies 
into account rather than prohibit them from doing so.254
The task of developing rules to accommodate the interests of people with 
little bargaining power in a specific context is formidable. The certainty that 
bright line rules offer may have to yield to an inexact standard of conduct like the 
one this Article proposes.255 That standard assigns to the lawyer the burden of 
representing all interests that the representation will affect. This new rule of 
conduct is based upon a multiple party representation model in which the lawyer 
has a primary client but will look after other clients and constituencies with an 
underlying do no harm standard. Under the multiple client model, lawyering 
becomes inclusive rather than isolating as it is now. 
The proposed standard of conduct requires the lawyer to do what many 
lawyers always have done.256 They treat each representational setting as if they 
have several clients who wish to work together but have moderately diverging 
interests. Because the current rules limit multiple party representation, lawyers 
may not acknowledge that the clients interests diverge or that the lawyer is 
engaging in the balancing of interests. Even if, as Hazard describes it, the lawyer 
is playing god, the practice may be unobjectionable nevertheless.257 It 
accomplishes the clients common objective as effectively, and often more 
effectively, than separate, adversarial representation would and tends to moderate 
the cost of the legal services for the transaction.258
Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political 
Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 80810 (1998). 
254 By focusing on the primacy of the client, Model Rule 1.2, for example, prohibits 
lawyers from considering third party interests in any meaningful way. 
255 See supra Part IV. 
256 See Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 76162. 
257 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 6465 (1978). 
258 See Dzienkowski, supra note 35 at 747; see also Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts 
of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407, 414 (1998). But see Bassett, supra note 21, at 43637 (arguing 
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The multiple client representation model would give substance to the vague 
hints in the Model Rules commentary concerning doing justice and moderating 
zeal when the adversary is inadequately or not represented.259 Such a rule frees 
lawyers to do what they do well without the need to worry that their conduct 
violates ethical limitations and potentially will attract disciplinary sanctions. The 
proposed rule permits lawyers to add thoughtful balance to their analytical 
guidance and keen problem-solving skills. Initially, the rule may have to remain 
aspirational and permissive, rather than mandatory, lest it become a source for 
malpractice claims.260 In a limited number of practice areas, however, including 
estate planning and securities practice where impacts on persons other than the 
direct client are immediately within the design of the client representation, the 
proposed rule should become the mandatory norm. 
Without doubt, each reader can identify specific situations in which the 
standard this Article proposes is impractical. Certainly the lawyer who represents 
a sports star negotiating for an increased salary from the team cannot respond 
adequately to the impact the salary will have on ticket prices and the general 
public. Higher ticket prices well may exclude some fans that will be unable or 
unwilling to pay the higher price.261 On the other hand, willingness to consider 
that the negotiated salary might result in exclusion of some fans, higher 
concession prices, or smaller community donations by the teams owner, extends 
cost-benefit analysis into the realm of items that are exceedingly difficult to 
quantify. Included in that realm are other matters that the proposed standard 
identifies as legitimate aspects of lawyers evaluative processes such as historical 
and continuing interpersonal relations, self-esteem of affected people, and the 
reputation of the client in the community. Thus, identifying fact patterns in which 
the Articles standard might be too broad or might fail completely is not a 
challenge. By permitting lawyers the flexibility to consider matters other than 
direct economic costs and benefits, the proposed standard empowers lawyers to 
serve their clients more effectively than current rules permit. The real challenge is 
to identify the array of instances in which lawyers would welcome the proposed 
standard that would allow them to represent their clients with a view toward their 
own and their clients position in a broader societal or familial context.  
that attorney disqualification results in cost and effort duplication and eliminates potential cost 
savings). 
259 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT pmbl. (2002). 
260 As noted earlier, ethical rules generally do not provide a source for malpractice 
liability, but most jurisdictions view them as evidence of the standard of conduct. Supra note 52 
and accompanying text. A significant change in the rules may lead some to use the change as an 
argument for imposing malpractice liability. 
261 A colleague proposed this hypothetical instance to highlight the flaw of the broad-
based reach of the proposed standard. 
